Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2021

Board Gender Diversity: A Path to Achieving Substantive Equality
in the United States
Kimberly A. Houser
University of North Texas, kimberly.houser@unt.edu

Jamillah Bowman Williams
Georgetown University Law Center, jamillah.williams@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2408
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796137

William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 63, P. 497.
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the
Law Commons

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY: A PATH TO ACHIEVING
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

KIMBERLY A. HOUSER* & JAMILLAH BOWMAN WILLIAMS**
ABSTRACT
While the European Union (EU) was founded on the concept of
equality as a fundamental value in 1993, the United States was
created at a time when women were considered legally inferior to
men. This has had the lasting effect of preventing women in the
United States from making inroads into positions of power. While
legislated board gender diversity (BGD) mandates have been
instituted in some EU countries, the United States has been loath to
take that route, relying instead on the goodwill of corporate boards,
with little progress. On September 30, 2018, however, California
enacted a law that has stirred much controversy for requiring at least
one woman to be on the boards of corporations headquartered in the
state by 2020. Based on our analysis, the California bill and other
similar legislative efforts will fail without parallel constitutional
action and cultural change in the United States.
We begin by examining the individual, institutional, and cultural
reasons why the United States lags so far behind the rest of the
industrialized world. We then discuss recent activism by powerful
institutions such as Nasdaq and Goldman Sachs that may signify
broader cultural change and receptiveness to positive action. Next,
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at the Paris Campus of Emlyon Business School on June 20-21, 2019, for their suggestions.
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for her patience as I juggled two babies and writing during the pandemic, to Hillary Sale and
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Panero for research support. We dedicate this paper to the life and work of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
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we conduct an analysis of the legislative, cultural, and constitutional
factors that have helped the EU succeed in increasing board
diversity. We conclude by offering a normative solution that can
pave the way to achieving gender equality in the United States.
Learning from the EU model, the United States must let go of the
Equal Rights Amendment and adopt a Substantive Equality
Amendment to the Constitution requiring positive action to facilitate
laws enabling gender equality. This solution will have broad cultural
impact outside of the board context and will help change the lived
experiences and outcomes for women in the United States for
generations to come. It will change the course of history.
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“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made.”
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court Justice1
INTRODUCTION
While gender equality is a fundamental right in most industrialized nations, true substantive equality has not been attained in the
United States.2 Our focus on substantive equality acknowledges that
even with an antidiscrimination framework that establishes
equality before the law, historical disadvantage continues to shape
outcomes for women, racial and ethnic minorities, and other
subordinated groups.3 In 2020, the United States ranked 53 out of
153 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index with 17 out of 27
European Union (EU) member states scoring higher and 5 of those
in the top 10.4 As member states in the EU continue to make
progress, women in the United States have failed to make substantial inroads in important decision-making roles in politics, business,
and other seats of power.

1. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2009, 1:25
AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ginsburg-court-woman/story?id=7513795 [https://perma.
cc/Y62G-MCTX].
2. Although the term gender equity is more commonly used in the United States, we
choose gender equality as more representative of the goal of this paper. “Gender equity is the
process of being fair to women and men,” while “[g]ender equality requires equal enjoyment
by women and men of socially-valued goods, opportunities, resources and rewards.” Frequently
Asked Questions About Gender Equality, U.N. POPULATION FUND (2005), https://www.unfpa.
org/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-gender-equality [https://perma.cc/JXM6VDYQ].
3. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REV.
1, 11-12 (2011) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Substantive Equality]; Catherine Barnard & Bob
Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562, 562 (2000); Sandra Fredman,
Substantive Equality Revisited, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 712, 712-13 (2016); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1281-83 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality]; Catharine A. MacKinnon & Kimberlé W.
Crenshaw, Reconstituting the Future: The Equality Amendment, 129 YALE L.J.F. 343, 346-47
(2019).
4. See WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2020 9 tbl.1 (2019). Additionally,
the United States keeps moving further down the list, representing how it is falling behind
other countries in terms of gender equality. See Saadia Zahidi, America Is Falling Behind
Other Countries in Gender Equality. The Next President Must Fix That, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct.
27, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/global-gender-gap-2016-usa-saadia-zahidi/
[https://perma.cc/YJ3P-YE72].
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The United States has rapidly been losing its status as a global
power founded on democratic principles due to its leadership’s active
involvement in reducing the rights of women, Black people, and
other marginalized groups.5 Women in the United States are still
paid less than men for the same jobs, have little recourse when
discriminated against, even when the discrimination is overt, and
have been kept out of important economic and political decisionmaking roles for hundreds of years.6 Many argue that a limited
pipeline of available talent explains the underrepresentation of
women on boards and other leadership positions in the United
States.7 In reality, a deeply ingrained culture of exclusion, along
with continuing institutional- and individual-level bias, are the
primary reasons women continue to be marginalized.8
5. See Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Janell Fetterolf & Kat
Devlin, America’s International Image Continues to Suffer, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/americas-international-image-continues-tosuffer/ [https://perma.cc/9HBK-JYUP]; Kate Whiting, Female Leaders Warn About the Erosion
of Women’s Rights, WORLD ECON. F. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/
female-leaders-warn-about-the-erosion-of-women-s-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DK47-CY27]. This
includes stacking federal judgeships with those receiving endorsements from conservative,
anti-female organizations shockingly on the fringe. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff,
Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.
html [https://perma.cc/W5QF-7QUR]. Two-thirds of the fifty-one appellate court appointments
(representing more than 25 percent of this branch of the government) were white males; two
of President Trump’s appointments to the Supreme Court were also conservative white
males—one with a record of anti-female rhetoric and behavior. See id.; Kate Kelly & David
Enrich, Kavanaugh’s Yearbook Page Is ‘Horrible, Hurtful’ to a Woman It Named, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/brett-kavanaugh-yearbookrenate.html [https://perma.cc/DVZ8-RR3J]. Although this Article focuses on gender, our
arguments have broad implications for racial inequality and intersectionality. See Nina
Banks, Black Women’s Labor Market History Reveals Deep-Seated Race and Gender
Discrimination, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 19, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/blackwomens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/ [https://
perma.cc/NG5C-4GGM].
6. See Tom Spiggle, The Gender Pay Gap: Why It’s Still Here, FORBES (May 25, 2021,
12:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2021/05/25/the-gender-pay-gap-why-itsstill-here/?sh=ddb46897baf6 [https://perma.cc/NA2Y-8LYU]; Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 546-47 (2018) (reviewing the troubling trend of courts failing to find
explicit evidence of discrimination sufficient to support a claim of discrimination); infra Part
I.
7. See Susan Chira, Why Women Aren’t C.E.O.s, According to Women Who Almost Were,
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/sunday-review/women-ceosglass-ceiling.html [https://perma.cc/C4EG-9C6A].
8. In this Article, we focus on gender diversity broadly speaking to include all individuals

502

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:497

The federal government has no national policy to address this
deficiency9 nor does it have a constitutional requirement to do so
according to the U.S. Supreme Court.10 In fact, the previous
administration attempted to roll back women’s rights.11 While the
European Union was founded on a set of values and fundamental
rights, including gender equality,12 the founders of the United
States did not consider women their equals, establishing women’s
status as inferior to men.13 The U.S. Constitution created a legal
identifying as women; however, it should be noted that women of color and LGBTQ+ women
face unique and heightened challenges. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the
Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with
Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1105-07 (2005); Jamillah Bowman Williams,
Maximizing #MeToo: Intersectionality & the Movement, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1797, 1800-02, 184344 & n.254 (2021). Even when boards focus on increasing gender or racial diversity, women
of color are left out; despite constituting 18 percent of the U.S. population, they make up only
4.6 percent of Fortune 500 board seats. See Too Few Women of Color on Boards: Statistics and
Solutions, CATALYST (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-minoritiescorporate-boards/ [https://perma.cc/DC3T-MJUE].
9. Drafted in 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, has 189 signatories but was never adopted
by the United States. See Linda Lowen, Why Won’t the U.S. Ratify the CEDAW Human Rights
Treaty?, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/why-wont-u-s-ratify-cedaw3533824 [https://perma.cc/9P8L-VSUA]; cf. Gender Equality Strategy, EUR. COMM’N, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equalitystrategy_en [https://perma.cc/7B5K-PNFN] (“The EU Gender Equality Strategy delivers on
the von der Leyen Commission’s commitment to achieving a Union of Equality. The Strategy
presents policy objectives and actions to make significant progress by 2025 towards a genderequal Europe.”).
10. There is a belief among some that gender balancing quotas are somehow discriminatory against men. See David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class:
Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 WIS.
L. REV. 657, 662-63, 669-71 (2000) (describing “reverse discrimination” cases where white or
male plaintiffs claim that preference given to non-whites or females is illegal).
11. See Colum Lynch & Robbie Gramer, At the U.N., America Turns Back the Clock on
Women’s Rights, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 14, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/
14/at-united-nations-women-rights-gender-health-trump-diplomacy/ [https://perma.cc/4688P758 (describing how the U.S. attempted to eliminate language providing protections for
women’s health at the 2019 annual U.N. Commission on the Status of Women conference).
12. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 2-3, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union arts. 8, 10, 19, 157, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47
[hereinafter TFEU]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 21, 23, Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391; Martina Schonard, Equality Between Men and Women, EUR.
PARLIAMENT (Nov. 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/59/equality-10
[https://perma.cc/9758-3AY9].
13. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 MINN.
J.L. & INEQ. 17, 17 (1988) (“We have a 200-year-old Constitution, ... [however,] it left out the
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system in which women were not afforded citizenship,14 were prevented from owning property,15 did not have the right to vote,16
could not sit on a jury17 or practice law,18 and were considered dependents—and in some situations property—of white males.19
Although women in the United States have made progress since
the Constitution was written, the legal system continues to place
obstacles in the way of true equality.20 Should things continue with
majority of the adult population: slaves, debtors, paupers, Indians, and women. As framed in
1787, the Constitution was a document of governance for and by white, propertied adult
males—a document for people who were free from dependence on others and therefore not
susceptible to influence or control by masters, overlords, or superiors.”). Even though the
Constitution did not originally use the terms “men” or “male,” in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment defined “citizens” and “voters” as male. See id. at 18.
14. Women were not granted citizenship until the Cable Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-346,
42 Stat. 1021, 1021-22. The Act is also known as the Married Women’s Independent
Nationality Act. Tanya Ballard Brown, That Time American Women Lost Their Citizenship
Because They Married Foreigners, NPR (Mar. 17, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2017/03/17/520517665/that-time-american-women-lost-their-citizenshipbecause-they-married-foreigners [https://perma.cc/KJZ2-U8PW].
15. Jone Johnson Lewis, A Short History of Women’s Property Rights in the United States,
THOUGHTCO. (July 13, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/property-rights-of-women-3529578
[https://perma.cc/86MF-XXCT].
16. Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 18.
17. Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of
Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1129 (1994).
18. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 132-33 (1872) (“That God designed the
sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and
execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth. In view of these facts, we are
certainly warranted in saying that when the legislature gave to this court the power of
granting licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege
would be extended to women.”).
19. Single women were considered dependents of their father and married women
dependents of their husbands. Women and the Law, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2010), https://www.
library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/collections/women_law/ [https://perma.cc/3V6J-8H4G]. The law of coverture gave a husband complete control over his wife. Id. It was state law that began to open
up certain rights to women; the first state to permit women to hold property in their own
name, albeit with their husbands’ permission, was Mississippi in 1839. See Sandra Moncrief,
The Mississippi Married Women’s Property Act of 1839, HANCOCK CNTY. HIST. SOC’Y (2008),
http://www.hancockcountyhistoricalsociety.com/vignettes/the-mississippi-married-womensproperty-act-of-1839/ [https://perma.cc/3CEE-QU2B].
20. Women, on average, still make only seventy-eight cents for every dollar earned by
men; furthermore, Black women make only sixty-four cents and Latinas only fifty-four cents
for each dollar earned by white men. Women’s Rights, ACLU (2020), https://www.aclu.org/
issues/womens-rights [https://perma.cc/T8QE-UJ6L]. Laws alleged to provide equal treatment
for men and women in the workplace have created burdens of proof that are almost impossible
to meet, resulting in few outcomes favorable to women who have been discriminated against.
See How the Laws of the United States Do Not Ensure Equal Participation in the Workforce
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business as usual in the United States, it will take thirty years for
women to achieve parity on corporate boards, eighty years to
achieve parity in CEO positions, and one hundred years to achieve
parity in Congress.21 An alarming finding of the World Economic
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report, which measures progress toward gender equality around the world, is that in 2018, the closing
of the gap slowed down—significantly.22 The concern is great among
women leaders, some of whom have written an open letter stating
that it is of utmost importance to “reinvest in policies and in legal
and social frameworks that will achieve gender equality and inclusion.”23 While multiple reasons have been given for the slowdown,
a major concern is the recent increase in world leaders publicly
denigrating women.24
for Women and Mothers, SPIGGLE L. FIRM, https://www.spigglelaw.com/employment-blog/
laws-united-states-not-ensure-equal-participation-workforce-women-mothers/
[https://perma.cc/ CJ5P-NHXU]. Additionally, current U.S. law is insufficient to address
nonobvious, unintentional discrimination. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the
Diversity Problem in the Tech Industry? Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment DecisionMaking, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 290, 305-07 (2019); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 111618 (2006); Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal
Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/
[https://perma.cc/R7ST-DUL7] (explaining how the current lack of diversity in the composition
of the judiciary was made worse under Trump).
21. Jessica Yun, Women CEOs Will Have to Wait Another 80 Years for Parity with Men,
YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/women-ceos-will-wait-another80-years-parity-men-230510116.html [https://perma.cc/NED8-GXKJ]; Christianna Silva,
Don’t Hold Your Breath for Gender Parity in Congress—It Could Take Another 100 Years,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 3, 2016, 12:36 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/dont-holdyour-breath-for-gender-parity-in-congress-it-could-take-another-100-years/ [https://perma.cc/
NY78-WRAM].
22. See WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2018 15 (2018).
23. Whiting, supra note 5.
24. A letter signed by twenty-six current and former female world leaders warned that
in some countries ensuring the basic rights of women is seen as threatening the current power
of men. See id. One of the authors, Susana Malcorra, the former Argentinian foreign minister,
suggested that “the rise of populism in some countries had led to ‘a macho-type strongman’
leader who feel[s] threatened by women gaining respect.” Id. The recent elections of Donald
Trump and Boris Johnson reflect this trend. See Gideon Rachman, Boris Johnson’s Britain
Is a Test Case for Strongman Politics, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
8895ad84-d2d8-11e9-a0bd-ab8ec6435630 [https://perma.cc/HRL7-8UQK]. In 2020, we also
saw women leaving the workplace in droves, as well as an increase in violence against women.
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Violence Against Women and Girls: The Shadow Pandemic, UN
WOMEN (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/4/statement-ed-
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In this Article, we examine the way in which laws and initiatives
designed to increase the participation of women on corporate boards
reflect how the EU and United States fundamentally differ in their
views of gender equality. The dominant perspective in the United
States is that women and men have an equal opportunity because
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide protection, even though substantive
equality has never been achieved.25 While there are proponents and
opponents of the revived Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), we agree
with Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s pronouncement that “I would like to
see a new beginning. I’d like it to start over.”26
One of the reasons women have been prevented from making
inroads into important decision-making roles in the United States
is that the U.S. Constitution, while riddled by a troubled history of
discrimination, offers no support for substantive gender equality.27
The ERA, as currently worded, will not achieve the substantive
equality many of its proponents believe it will because it is based on
an antidiscrimination framework that focuses on individualized
harms rather than systemic change.28 More specifically, the anticlassification approach of the ERA would prevent use of laws that
permit or require positive action.29 The need for positive action is
based on an antisubordination model that places obligations on
public and private bodies to address the disparities in their ranks.30

phumzile-violence-against-women-during-pandemic [https://perma.cc/V997-FPS9]; Courtney
Connley, More Than 860,000 Women Dropped out of the Labor Force in September, According
to New Report, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/02/865000women-dropped-out-of-the-labor-force-in-september-2020.html [https://perma.cc/7364-Y64S].
25. See Anita Raj, Where Is Gender Equality in the United States?, GEO. INST. FOR WOMEN,
PEACE & SEC. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/where-is-gender-equality-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/B4BH-Q7PY]; Fredman, supra note 3, at 712-13.
26. Russell Berman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Versus the Equal Rights Amendment, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://amp.theatlantic.com/amp/article/606556/ [https://perma.cc/CUV6EQFQ].
27. See MacKinnon, Substantive Equality, supra note 3, at 1-2, 11-12.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Why the Equal Rights Amendment Would Endanger Women’s
Equality: Lessons from Colorblind Constitutionalism, 16 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
4 (2021).
30. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 9 (2003).
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Those who fully buy into false notions of meritocracy and equal
opportunity reject the idea of positive action and opine that men
dominate leadership positions because they are more qualified and
women simply lack the interest or required skill set.31 However, a
growing body of research shows that the opposite is actually true.
In many cases, women provide leadership that better serves the
well-being of their constituents relative to men.32 For example, had
women been at the helm of major corporations in the 1990s, we may
not have seen the corporate greed and unethical behavior that caused trillions in lost investments and the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act;33 we may not have seen the foreclosure crisis of 2006 that
sank the global economy into a great recession;34 and the United
States likely would not have seen the major loss of life due to the
individualistic style of leadership present with respect to COVID19.35
Not only do women on boards bring a different perspective to
decision-making, but research also suggests that their presence
makes the men on their teams process information more thoroughly,
so they are more reflective and open-minded.36 This heterogeneity
leads to a smarter and better informed decision-making process,
and also prevents problematic groupthink that contributes to unethical and destructive decisions.37 Thus, including more women in
31. See Courtney Connley, Ambition Is Not the Problem: Women Want the Top Jobs—They
Just Don’t Get Them, CNBC (Jan. 12, 2021, 8:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/05/whywomen-are-locked-out-of-top-jobs-despite-having-high-ambition.html [https://perma.cc/U6UFDWCR].
32. See DAVID A.H. BROWN, DEBRA L. BROWN & VANESSA ANASTASOPOULOS, WOMEN ON
BOARDS: NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING ... BUT THE “BRIGHT” THING 6 (2002).
33. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity
in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 837 (2003).
34. See Eur. Parl. Ass’n, Women and the Economic and Financial Crisis, Doc. No. 12195
(Apr. 8, 2010), https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12394 [https://perma.cc/4A6X-VRK3] (click the PDF
symbol right of the "Report" heading).
35. See Kate Maclean, Women Leaders and Coronavirus: Look Beyond Stereotypes to Find
the Secret to Their Success, CONVERSATION (June 29, 2020, 9:50 AM), http://theconversation.
com/women-leaders-and-coronavirus-look-beyond-stereotypes-to-find-the-secret-to-theirsuccess-141414 [https://perma.cc/2WPK-RQ6J].
36. See Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/ [https://perma.cc/
462U-YQNY].
37. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing problems associated with “groupthink,” which Janis

2021]

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY

507

important decision-making roles is crucial not only for equity and
moral reasons, but also will lead to better outcomes.38
As used herein, the term Board Gender Diversity (BGD) means
that the board of a publicly held company contains a certain minimum percentage of women.39 We use BGD as a proxy for economic
decision-making power, which we argue is fundamental for women
to make inroads into economic equality while understanding that
this is just a first step. In Part I, we provide an overview of board
representation in the EU and United States and discuss the individual, institutional, and cultural forces that continue to keep women
on the sidelines. In Part II, we discuss recent institutional activism
that may be a sign of broader cultural change. In Part III, we examine U.S. legislative efforts, including California SB 826, the first
and only law in the United States to require board diversity. In Part
IV, we review the EU approach to increasing BGD by examining
legislative, cultural, and constitutional factors. And in Part V, we
defines as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a
cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of actions”); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board:
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2003); Kristin Johnson, Steven
A. Ramirez & Cary Martin Shelby, Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank Section 342
Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1806-10 (2016); Robert A.
Peterson, Gerald Albaum, Dwight Merunka, Jose Luis Munuera & Scott M. Smith, Effects of
Nationality, Gender, and Religiosity on Business-Related Ethicality, 96 J. BUS. ETHICS 573,
574, 582 (2010) (discussing evidence which suggests women make more ethical decisions in
many contexts).
38. See Chris Bart & Gregory McQueen, Why Women Make Better Directors, 8 INT’L J.
BUS. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 93, 94-95 (2013).
39. While some define BGD as permitting just one woman to be added to a board, most
initiatives look for a minimum percentage of each gender. See infra note 380 and accompanying text (noting several countries with binding minimum percentages). While 30 percent
is usually considered to be the minimum, others strive for no less than 33.3 percent, and some
political quotas strive for no less than 40 percent of each gender. See Legislative Quotas Can
Be Strong Drivers for Gender Balance in Boardrooms, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. (June
28, 2019), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/data-talks/legislative-quotas-can-bestrong-drivers-gender-balance-boardrooms [https://perma.cc/5KAM-WXVP]. The 30 percent
minimum most likely stems from research showing that it takes three women on a board of
ten directors to achieve “critical mass.” See Carolyn Wiley & Mireia Monllor-Tormos, Board
Gender Diversity in the STEM & F Sectors: The Critical Mass Required to Drive Firm Performance, 25 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 290, 294-95 (2018). Because of the
variation among EU member states and the United States regarding BGD requirements, we
use both “BGD requirements” and “quotas” to mean legislated minimum gender representation requirements. When examining non-legislated gender goals, we use the terms
“voluntary targets” or “voluntary quotas.”
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build on our comparative analysis of the U.S. and EU models and
propose that positive action is necessary to achieve meaningful and
sustainable gender equality in the United States.
Our analysis reveals that BGD requirements have been used
more effectively in the EU than in the United States because the EU
member states have constitutional amendments that have paved
the way for positive action.40 Although calls for adopting the Equal
Rights Amendment in the United States have resurfaced, we do not
believe the language contained therein is sufficient, nor will it have
the effect hoped for by those promoting it.41
I. WHY THE UNITED STATES LAGS BEHIND IN GENDER DIVERSITY
The percentage of women on boards in the Russell 3000 index
(R3000), which includes many of the public companies in the United
States, hovers around 20 percent.42 Despite the availability of
qualified female board candidates, few are selected using current
selection methods, which predominantly feature the appointment of
men known to men occupying current positions on boards.43 These
40. See infra Part IV.C. Voluntary measures become protected against reverse
discrimination actions through specific exclusions in the constitutional amendment or
legislation authorizing, but not requiring, such measures. See infra Part IV.C. This is
especially important as the United States has permitted white men to successfully bring
discrimination cases to stop companies from taking positive measures to diversify their
workforce and management. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 662.
41. With the renewed interest in passing an Equal Rights Amendment in the United
States, it is important to understand what such an amendment can and cannot do. See
Berman, supra note 26. This paper will build upon research by Julie C. Suk and Christopher
McCrudden on the constitutional foundations of equality laws that do work. See infra Part V.
We explain the reasons for the lack of progress by women in the United States in gaining
leadership positions, the differences in legal strategies between the EU and the United States,
and how quotas could be the answer if the Constitution is amended to mandate positive action
to achieve gender equality, much like what has been done in the EU. See infra Parts III.C.,
IV, V.
42. See Rachel Feintzeig, Women’s Share of Board Seats Rises to 20%, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
11, 2019, 6:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/womens-share-of-board-seats-rises-to-2011568194200 [https://perma.cc/YUN3-MM2Q]. In many industries, that figure is much lower;
in tech companies, for example, only 15 percent of board members are female. See Jennifer
S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company Boards, 46 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 345, 350 (2019).
43. See Jena McGregor, The Boardroom Is Still an Old Boy’s Club, WASH. POST (Sept. 25,
2013, 2:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2013/09/25/corpor
ate-boardrooms-are-still-old-boys-clubs/ [https://perma.cc/FS9T-5RS4].
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statistics demonstrate that the well-known reference to the “old
[boys’] club” is alive and well.44 As of 2018, a staggering half of the
companies on the R3000 had no women directors or only one woman
on their boards.45 The R3000 is an index fund consisting of about 98
percent of all publicly held companies incorporated in the United
States.46 Additionally, 80 percent of the top twenty-five initial public
offerings in the United States had no women directors or only one
woman on their boards.47 Women are even more underrepresented
in “the most influential board positions,” such as “chairs of compensation, audit, and nominating committees.”48
This failure to achieve gender parity is due to interrelated
systems of bias including: (1) the individual cognitive biases of those
in gatekeeping roles; (2) institutional bias, or the process through
which board members are selected; and (3) cultural norms in the
United States.49 Without addressing these underlying barriers,
women will continue to be excluded from positions of power and
influence in society, including corporate boards.
A. Individual Bias: The Brain
1. Stereotypes About Competence
A society’s history and culture shape individual beliefs about who
is perceived to be most competent in leadership roles.50 Some may
make a “pool” or “pipeline” argument that there is a lack of women
44. See id.
45. Press Release, 2020 Women on Boards, 2020 Women on Boards Reports Half of
Russell 3000 Companies Lack Women Directors on Boards, IPOs Fare Worse (Nov. 8, 2018,
10:15 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181108005102/en/2020-WomenBoards-Reports-Russell-3000-Companies [https://perma.cc/VK76-CBVZ].
46. See James Chen, Russell 3000 Index, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/r/russell_3000.asp [https://perma.cc/GGZ2-74CB].
47. Press Release, 2020 Women on Boards, supra note 45.
48. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How
Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 381 & n.28 (2014).
49. See infra Parts I.A-C.
50. See, e.g., Debbie A. Thomas, Bias in the Boardroom: Implicit Bias in the Selection and
Treatment of Women Directors, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 539, 548-50 (2018); Cecilia L. Ridgeway &
Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs
and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510, 522-24 (2004); CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED
BY GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 80-85 (2011).
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qualified to serve as directors.51 However, this is a common misconception that is based on stereotypes and not supported by research.52
As of October 2019, data “for 99.9% of 29,015 individual directors
and C-Suite executives at companies that were constituents of the
MSCI ACWI Index” showed no “notable differences in financial
expertise between male and female directors of companies domiciled
in developed market countries.”53 In fact, female executives and
directors were more likely to have financial expertise in emerging
markets.54 In risk expertise, the data also showed “no significant
expertise gap between the two genders across global companies.”55
Women also face perception biases in the workplace that make
them more likely to be considered to “lack the qualities of effective
leaders.”56 For example, gender stereotypes affect “perceptions of
competence,” as well as perceptions of who deserves the attribution
of traits like “intelligence, drive, and commitment.”57 Although
women earn higher grades and receive more advanced degrees than
men, women are routinely passed over for positions requiring a high
level of intelligence.58 Informal social norms, such as the notion that
51. See OLGA EMELIANOVA & CHRISTINA MILHOMEM, MSCI, WOMEN ON BOARDS: 2019
PROGRESS REPORT 17 (2019), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/29f5bf79-cf87-71a5ac26-b435d3b6fc08 [https://perma.cc/Y8DD-U8LJ].
52. See id. at 17-18; Thomas, supra note 50, at 547-50.
53. EMELIANOVA & MILHOMEM, supra note 51, at 17-18.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. See generally Linda H. Chen, Jeffrey Gramlich & Kimberly A. Houser, The Effects
of Board Gender Diversity on a Firm’s Risk Strategies, 59 ACCT. & FIN. 991 (2019) (concluding
that a diverse board reduces a firm’s exposure to reputational risk, which is associated with
improved board monitoring and accountability, mitigating the tendency toward groupthink,
incorporating a broader scope of perspectives into decision-making processes, and resulting
in higher levels of complex moral reasoning by incorporating ethical, environmental, and
societal responsibilities; but also demonstrating no difference between gender diverse boards
and all-male boards with respect to financial risk exposure).
56. Thomas, supra note 50, at 549. Additionally, the “glass cliff” phenomenon may
exacerbate this perception as women may be promoted to leadership positions only after the
company is placed in a precarious position by a male leader. See Susanne Bruckmüller & Nyla
R. Branscombe, How Women End up on the “Glass Cliff”, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at
26, 26. This results in the women being blamed for their predecessors’ mistakes. See id.
(noting that “[o]nly if male leaders have maneuvered an organization into trouble is a switch
to a female leader preferred,” indicating that female leaders may then have to absorb the
blowback of their male predecessors’ pitfalls).
57. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 405.
58. See Lin Bian, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Andrei Cimpian, Evidence of Bias Against Girls
and Women in Contexts That Emphasize Intellectual Ability, 73 AM. PSYCH. 1139, 1139-40,
1149 (2018).
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even high-powered women do the family work, further perpetuate
gender roles that then limit the number of women perceived to be
available and qualified for high status, decision-making roles.59
Research demonstrates that individuals will shift their definitions
of merit to prioritize the qualifications that men hold.60 In one
study, when the resume of a male applicant had more education
than the woman, education was said to be more important after the
man was chosen.61 However, when the qualifications on the resumes
were switched and the man had more experience and less education, those choosing the male applicant stated experience was more
valuable.62 This illustrates how much the evaluation of who is “qualified” for positions of power is clouded by gender stereotypes.63
Even when women defeat the odds and rise to the prized rank of
CEO, they continue to be plagued by bias. Some women will attend
more prestigious schools with hopes of overcoming these stereotypes, but even women CEOs with the highest tier educational
credentials are less likely than their male counterparts to be named
chair of their companies’ boards, are paid less, and have shorter tenures as CEOs.64 This type of discrimination remains prevalent in
American society.65
2. Unconscious Biases
While some stereotypes about women’s competence and leadership abilities may be consciously held, unconscious biases may also
plague the decision-making of those in power. Because men hold

59. See Geeta Tewari, Emma DeCourcy & Shirley Ureña, The Ethics of Gender Narratives
for United States Corporate Boards, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 221, 249 (2019).
60. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit
to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 474, 474 (2005).
61. See id. at 475.
62. See id. at 476.
63. See id. at 474.
64. See Michael Holmes, Why Are There So Few Women CEO’s?, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept.
9, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/women-workforce-senior-level/ [https://
perma.cc/7MQL-289F].
65. See, e.g., id.
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most board and executive positions, they serve as the gatekeepers
to board entry.66 This is especially troublesome, as affinity or “ingroup” bias serves as a barrier to women.67 Affinity bias is a preference for people like ourselves and is commonly unconscious or
perceived as harmless because it is not overt and malicious sexism.68
However, this type of unconscious bias can be just as damaging
because it contributes to the argument that not enough qualified
women are available to hold prestigious board roles.69 In reality,
nominating committees are simply not looking for women due to
their preexisting biases.70 These unconscious biases cause board
members to seek new directors who “look and sound like they do,”71
favoring those with similar traits and pedigrees over candidates who
may not run in their social circles, and making diversity a near
impossibility.72
This affinity bias is compounded by the validity illusion. As Nobel
Prize winner Daniel Kahneman has shown, humans are not only
unaware of the reasons for their decisions, but they also place a
false sense of belief in the accuracy of their own decisions, which are
heavily influenced by these unconscious biases.73 Thus, those with
the power to choose board members are often unaware or unwilling
to acknowledge they are making poor choices.74 Accordingly, these
66. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
67. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 404-05.
68. See Houser, supra note 20, at 304 & n.82.
69. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 405-06.
70. See Houser, supra note 20, at 304-05.
71. See Thomas, supra note 50, at 559 (quoting U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-1630, CORPORATE BOARDS: STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE
FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 13 (2015)).
72. See id. (finding that recommendations for board members may come from CEOs who
often “select their cultural and demographic clones”) (quoting Steven A. Ramirez, Games
CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms
and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1591-92 (2004)).
73. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80
PSYCH. REV. 237, 249 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman & Shane
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 51-52 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20-22 (2011); Daniel
Kahneman, Andrew M. Rosenfield, Linnea Gandhi & Tom Blaser, NOISE: How to Overcome
the High, Hidden Cost of Inconsistent Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2016, at 38, 43.
74. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 73, at 249.
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cognitive biases are likely to result in men being given positions
even when less qualified.75 Men are chosen based on perceived
potential, while women must go above and beyond to prove their
worth through past experience.76 For example, it is estimated that
77 percent of male directors have no prior experience, compared
with 68 percent of females.77 This is a double standard that reinforces the gender hierarchy and continues to perpetuate the exclusion of women from boards.
“[E]xposure to counterstereotypical exemplars” has been shown
to reduce these unconscious biases.78 As more women gain access to
positions of power, the representative bias79 can be used to help
dispel the unconscious association of “leaders” with “men.”80 This is
consistent with Kahneman’s finding in Thinking, Fast and Slow,
that the more we are exposed to something, the better we feel about
it.81 Based on this research, it is important to find strategies that
expose male leaders to highly qualified women board members and
75. See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J.
Graham & Jo Handelsman, Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16474, 16477 (2012) (“[F]emale student[s] [were judged] to be less
competent and less worthy of being hired than ... identical male student[s], and also [were]
offered ... a smaller starting salary and less career mentoring.”).
76. See Eileen Pollack, Why Are There Still So Few Women in Science?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/magazine/why-are-there-still-so-fewwomen-in-science.html [https://perma.cc/5K3A-BCAN]; Joan C. Williams, Katherine W.
Phillips & Erika V. Hall, Tools for Change: Boosting the Retention of Women in the STEM
Pipeline, 6 J. RSCH. GENDER STUD. 11, 11 (2016) (“Black women scientists were more likely
than other women to report that they had to prove themselves more than their colleagues, ...
Asian-American women scientists reported more pressure to behave in feminine ways (and
more push-back if they didn’t), and Latina scientists were more likely to be called ‘angry’ or
‘too emotional’ if they behaved assertively.”).
77. See Laura Colby, Men Join Corporate Boards with Less Experience than Women,
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0627/men-join-corporate-boards-with-less-experience-than-women-do [https://perma.cc/GKU82ZYR].
78. See Chloë FitzGerald, Angela Martin, Delphine Berner & Samia Hurst, Interventions
Designed to Reduce Implicit Prejudices and Implicit Stereotypes in Real World Contexts: A
Systematic Review, 7 BMC PSYCH., no. 29, 2019, at 1, 7.
79. See Tversky & Kahneman supra note 73, at 1124.
80. See generally Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande
& Petia Topalova, Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1497 (2009)
(explaining that placing women in prominent leadership roles reduces the impact of representative bias).
81. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 73, at 59-60, 65-67 (explaining that repetition contributes
to the positive feelings associated with “cognitive ease”).

514

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:497

candidates. This may reduce unconscious biases, help bring women
more easily to mind when nominating board members for consideration, and eventually normalize women in leadership roles.82
The following is an example that illustrates this point. Although
a handful of women were permitted to attend law school in the late
1800s, many were barred from practicing law.83 Women were
routinely kept out of the workforce as stereotyping and discrimination prevailed.84 While attending a dinner party, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg was asked by the Dean of Harvard Law School, which she
attended at the time, how she could take a law school seat away
from a man.85 However, by 2016 women exceeded the number of
men in law schools.86 Today, television, novels, and society in
general more readily accept that a woman is just as likely to be an
attorney as a man due to the exposure effect.87
B. Institutional Bias: The Process
Institutional bias is
[a] tendency for the procedures and practices of particular
institutions to operate in ways which result in certain social
groups being advantaged or favoured and others being disadvantaged or devalued. This need not be the result of any conscious
prejudice or discrimination but rather of the majority simply
following existing rules or norms.88
82. See, e.g., Beaman et al., supra note 80, at 1530.
83. See Cynthia M Wiseman, The Legal Education of Women: From “Treason Against
Nature” to Sounding a “Different Voice,” 74 MARQ. L. REV. 325, 330 (1991).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Asher Klein, At Harvard Law School, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Displayed the Steel She’d
Be Famous for, NBC BOS. (Sept. 19, 2020, 9:26 AM), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/
at-harvard-law-school-ruth-bader-ginsburg-displayed-the-steel-shed-be-famous-for/2197397/
[https://perma.cc/G3EV-88E6].
86. Law School Rankings by Female Enrollment (2018), ENJURIS (Dec. 16, 2018), https://
www.enjuris.com/students/law-school-female-enrollment-2018.html [https://perma.cc/W5CVBAGJ].
87. See Kerrianne Waters, From Rags to Riches: How the Portrayal of Female Attorneys
in the Media Has Evolved from Clothes and Fashion to Focus and Success, CATALYST, May
2013, at 1, 1-2; KAHNEMAN, supra note 73, at 66-67 (discussing the exposure effect).
88. Institutional Bias, Oxford Reference: A Dictionary of Media and Communication,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100005347 [https://
perma.cc/ULE4-TGE2].
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In addition to historical subordination of women, the current process through which board members are selected in the United States
has continued to result in a lack of gender diversity on corporate
boards.89 Both the narrowly defined candidate pool and network
homophily are institutional factors that reinforce the individual
biases discussed above.90
1. Narrowly Defined Pool
On a corporate board, the Nominating and Governance (N&G)
Committee ultimately reviews and recommends nominees for the
full board to approve and elect.91 According to the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the N&G Committee should be
composed of independent board directors alone.92 The “best practice”
for boards is that the entire board agrees on desired personal attributes that are provided as guidance for the N&G Committee.93
The most visible and sought-after candidates are those who have
previously held CEO positions and executive roles, and possess prior
directorship experience.94 This serves as a limiting factor for women
seeking access to corporate boards.
Based on this process, boards ultimately recruit from a select
pool in which women already hold few positions due to historical
exclusion.95 From the perspective of male directors, it is not bias, but
lack of executive experience preventing an increase in the percentage of women on boards.96 Yet, even when women make it to upper management, they are not typically considered because their
89. See supra Part I.
90. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the effects are amplified with respect to
Black women. For a discussion on intersectionality and how the predominantly white male
judiciary has failed Black women when it comes to discrimination, see generally Williams,
supra note 8.
91. Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking
About This?, 17 SCHOLAR 219, 243 (2015).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 244.
94. Id. at 249.
95. See, e.g., DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, PIONEERING WOMEN ON BOARDS:
PATHWAYS OF THE FIRST FEMALE DIRECTORS 1 (2013); Julia Carpenter, Women in the Fortune
500: 64 CEOs in Half a Century, CNN MONEY (Aug. 7, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/inter
active/pf/female-ceos-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/EE8G-UR6L].
96. Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 403.
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positions are not perceived to be responsible for profit and loss.97
This places even greater emphasis on being CEO of a publicly held
company and prior board experience.98 Although many women may
have the desired industry experience, they have not gained access
to this traditional pipeline to board service.99
The first time a woman held the position of CEO at a Fortune 500
company was in 1972.100 Despite the progress women have made in
the workplace overall, holding almost 52 percent of all professionaland management-level jobs, women remain vastly underrepresented in CEO roles.101 Women represent just 5 percent of CEOs at
Fortune 500 companies, with the percentage actually dropping between 2017 and 2019 from 5.1 percent to 4.9 percent.102 This huge
disparity is a core disadvantage to women interested in directorship
opportunities.103
In sum, the NYSE process has led boards to draw from a pool of
candidates in which women are vastly underrepresented.104 The
issue is not that women are not qualified, but rather that boards
have to expand the scope of their candidate pool.105 Importantly,
firms are not bound by these traditional criteria that fail to include
women. Rather than overly focusing on prior executive roles and
prior board experience, boards are free to set their own flexible
board qualification requirements.106 To account for these persisting
inequities, nominating committees must look outside of the traditional pipeline for the board of director candidates to the increasing
number of women in other C-Suite roles, including chief financial
officers, chief legal officers, chief diversity officers, and other
executive officers who are often not selected to serve.107 Even beyond
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 402.
100. Carpenter, supra note 95.
101. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.
(2021), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm [https://perma.cc/9P69-XHVV]; see Carpenter,
supra note 95.
102. EMELIANOVA & MILHOMEM, supra note 51, at 6.
103. Thomas, supra note 50, at 547-48.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 548; Celia Huber & Sara O’Rourke, How to Accelerate Gender Diversity on
Boards, MCKINSEY Q. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/leadership/
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these executive positions, the appointment pool can be expanded to
include other highly “qualified professionals such as senior attorneys, academics, consultants, nonprofit executives, accountants and
auditors.”108
2. Network Homophily
Related to the cognitive affinity bias discussed above, homophily
is based on the network principle that “contact between similar
people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people.”109
Based on this principle, “any social entity that depends to a substantial degree on networks for its transmission will tend to be localized in social space.”110 This homophily is perpetuated by “social
structures that induce propinquity among similar others,”111 such
as golf clubs, country clubs, sports clubs, board rooms, and other
elite and male-dominated spaces where leaders are selected from
closed networks, and often behind closed doors. In these secret
spaces, men have access through income and assets, while women
only “qualify as wives or inheriting daughters.”112 Some of these
spaces specifically ban female members.113
Because the nominating committees on boards tend to consist of
older white males,114 network homophily causes a biased selection
process that prevents women from gaining access.115 Arguing that
board members are chosen by merit ignores forty years of social

how-to-accelerate-gender-diversity-on-boards [https://perma.cc/N8U9-HURQ].
108. Trautman, supra note 91, at 251.
109. Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather:
Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 415, 416 (2001).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Brooke Cusmano, Intersections of Race, Class and Gender in Country Clubs, MEDIUM
(May 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@brooke.cusmano/intersections-of-race-class-and-genderin-country-clubs-60255cddc462 [https://perma.cc/VU5G-JW9X].
113. Elizabeth Segran, Social Clubs Died out in America. Now, Venture Capital Is Bringing Them Back, FAST CO. (May 28, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90350407/the-deathand-unlikely-rebirth-of-the-american-social-club [https://perma.cc/5LMU-7RGG].
114. Jena McGregor, Corporate Boards Are Still Mostly White, Mostly Male—and Getting
Even Older, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2018/04/24/corporate-boards-are-still-mostly-white-mostly-male-and-gettingeven-older/ [https://perma.cc/X5EN-236C].
115. See Thomas, supra note 50, at 559.
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science research.116 The selection process is primarily driven by
network structure, which relies on favoritism and convenience, not
objective indicators of merit.117 Since many boards do not have an
objective list of criteria uniformly applied to each candidate, and
because women may not be considered at all due to the nomination
process, this leaves the door wide open to individual stereotypes
and unconscious biases.118 Thus, reliance on closed networks and
highly subjective criteria can mask both explicit and unconscious
bias.119 Within these biased structures men are rarely going to be
motivated to change their own biases or the very systems that have
allowed them to maintain privilege and power for centuries.
A related institutional factor that limits BGD in the United
States is that women do not enjoy equal mentoring and networking
in the workplace relative to their male counterparts.120 A lack of
mentorship can prevent women from accessing “informal networks”
and other “female role models and sponsors to provide opportunities.”121 This inadequate “mentorship and sponsorship can also deprive women of advocates who will support efforts to recruit and
advance women as part of board agendas.”122
While encouraging women to solve the representation gap by
“leaning in” promotes the idea that women have “individualized
autonomy” over the issue, it does not incentivize elite males to give
up their control over access to corporate structures like boards.123
Therefore, purely private and individualized remedies will not be
able to tackle these institutional forces that have perpetuated male
domination over the board selection process.124

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Houser, supra note 20, at 318-21.
See Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 404.
Id. at 402, 404-07.
Id. at 404-06.
Thomas, supra note 50, at 549.
Id.
Id.
Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (2019).
Id.
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C. Cultural Bias: The Way of Life
The representation of women on corporate boards is also influenced by a country’s culture.125 While boards have been found to be
more diverse in countries with higher female labor market participation and countries with higher GDP per capita, this has not
held true for the United States.126 This is largely because the United
States also has a larger gender gap and stronger norms of masculinity, which lead to lower female board participation.127 A detailed
study published in 1984 by Geert Hofstede measured how values in
the workplace are influenced by culture.128 He defined culture as
“the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from others.”129 The Hofstede
Cultural Dimension Index was used to score each country researched in six categories.130 We focus our analysis on three of these
cultural factors related to gender equity: masculinity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance.
The masculinity index indicates the extent to which a culture
values traditionally masculine norms such as competition and being
“tough.”131 According to the index, a country with a high masculinity
score focuses on individual achievement, while a lower score is
associated with collaboration and collective wellbeing.132 This study
found that in high masculinity societies, gender roles are more
clearly distinct and men are expected to be “assertive, tough, and
focused on material success,” while women are expected to be “more
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.”133 High

125. Laura Cabeza-García, Esther B. Del Brio & Carlos Rueda, Legal and Cultural Factors
as Catalysts for Promoting Women in the Boardroom, 22 BUS. RSCH. Q. 56, 57 (2019).
126. Dale Griffin, Kai Li & Ting Xu, Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Innovation:
International Evidence, 56 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 123, 131 (2021).
127. See id.
128. See generally Geert Hofstede, Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning, 1
ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 81 (1984).
129. National Culture, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, https://hi.hofstede-insights.com/nationalculture [https://perma.cc/W75N-5GCX].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 297 (2d ed. 2001).
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masculinity cultures are also focused on stricter gender roles.134 At
the other end of the spectrum in societies low in masculinity, gender
roles overlap and are more fluid, and both men and women are more
collaborative and concerned with the quality of life.135
The power distance index represents the comfort a society has
with gaps in hierarchical levels.136 A country with a high power
distance score would indicate higher tolerance for inequality.137
Therefore, cultures with both high masculinity and high power distance scores would be less likely to value women in power.138
The uncertainty avoidance index indicates the extent to which the
culture requires certainty.139 A culture with a higher score on uncertainty avoidance is more apt to create and follow legal mandates.140
In examining the culture in the United States based on the
Hofstede scale,141 what becomes apparent is that its unique combination of a low power distance score, high masculinity score, and
low uncertainty avoidance score has created a situation in which the
phrase “all men are created equal”142 takes on special meaning.
Overall, the United States is on the lower end of power distance,
meaning that people generally want to at least perceive that there
is equality.143 The high masculinity score is evidenced by recent
pushes to return to a “traditional” family structure and increase
limitations on the rights of women.144 With a low uncertainty
134. See Hofstede, supra note 128, at 84.
135. Id.
136. National Culture, supra note 129.
137. Id.
138. Masculinity and power distance “are two factors that are highly correlated with the
assumption of gender roles in society. For this reason, such variables can be expected to have
an influence on the presence of women in business in general and especially on boards.”
Cabeza-García et al., supra note 125, at 60.
139. National Culture, supra note 129.
140. See id.
141. Country Comparison: United States, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, https://www.hofstedeinsights.com/country-comparison/the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/HC6T-ASWY].
142. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
143. See Country Comparison: United States, supra note 141. However, even when case law
seems to support equality, without accompanying legislation mandating it, actual practices
are not likely to change; therefore, this perception is largely a delusion. See, e.g., Darren
Rosenblum, The Supreme Court’s Decision Won’t Cure Inequality—Quotas Will, THE HILL
(June 19, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/503609-the-supreme-courtsdecision-wont-cure-inequality-quotas-will [https://perma.cc/NGM3-7ELE].
144. See, e.g., Mary Emily O'Hara, First 100 Days: How President Trump Has Impacted
LGBTQ Rights, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-
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avoidance score, legal rules are often eschewed as overly restrictive
on free will, and loopholes and strategies to circumvent the law are
commonplace.145
Unlike the EU, which has committed to creating substantive
equality for women, the United States has failed to ratify treaties
such as the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which has been ratified by all of
the members of the U.N. except Iran, Somalia, Sudan, and the
United States.146 In 2019, the United States additionally refused to
reaffirm its commitment to the Beijing Declaration of Women’s
Rights previously agreed to at the 1995 Conference of Women’s
Rights held at the U.N., demonstrating the country’s recent shift
away from equality for women.147
In terms of strategies to increase BGD, the United States has
relied on voluntary measures, which have failed miserably given
this cultural context.148 In countries with high levels of masculinity
like the United States,149 it is difficult for women to make inroads
into business and politics without legislative intervention. However,
in countries with lower levels of masculinity and power distance,
out/first-100-days-how-president-trump-has-impacted-lgbtq-rights-n750191 [https://perma.
cc/P87R-Q9SK]; Julie Moreau, Adoption Agency Should Be Able to Reject Gay Couples, Trump
Administration Argues, NBC NEWS (June 4, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/adoption-agency-should-be-able-reject-gay-couples-trump-administrationn1224911 [https://perma.cc/A35L-DT4L]. America’s reputation significantly declined abroad
after then-President Trump took office. See Kristen Bialik, How the World Views the U.S. and
Its President in 2018 in 9 Charts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2018/10/09/how-the-world-views-the-u-s-and-its-president-in-9-charts/ [https://
perma.cc/6R2K-XHFG]; Wike et al., supra note 5.
145. See Country Comparison: United States, supra note 141.
146. Lowen, supra note 9.
147. Liz Ford, US Accused of Trying to Dilute Global Agreements on Women’s Rights,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/
mar/18/us-accused-of-trying-to-dilute-international-agreements-un-commission-status-ofwomen [https://perma.cc/AQ3U-6WJK] (“Under the Trump administration, US negotiators
have found themselves more aligned with countries including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia
than European nations. These countries consistently seek to undermine agreements on
women’s rights at the UN, specifically around reproductive health and rights.”).
148. See Kimberly Gladman & Michelle Lamb, Board Diversity: Can Voluntary Change
Succeed?, GUARDIAN (May 21, 2013, 3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/women-inleadership/2013/may/21/can-voluntary-change-succeed [https://perma.cc/QJ2T-Z3SN].
149. Country Comparison: United States, supra note 141. Italy is an example of another
country with high levels of masculinity. See Country Comparison: Italy, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS,
https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/italy/ [https://perma.cc/Y9MG-E4V2].
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and higher uncertainty avoidance levels,150 rules setting voluntary
targets or softer nudges may be successful because corporations in
those countries are more amenable to the idea of gender equality
and do not require strict rules to accomplish it.
Legislative efforts are both more likely and more effective in low
masculinity cultures. For example, France, with a low masculinity
score,151 has been more successful at achieving BGD at least partly
because of the broader cultural context and framing of board diversity laws as “advancing humanity by ensuring that both halves are
represented, rather than as advancing the particular rights or
interests of women.”152 Countries with lower masculinity scores value collaboration over competition.153 However, even in countries
with high masculinity scores, like Italy, success can still be achieved
because their higher uncertainty avoidance makes such countries
more likely to comply with the law if BGD legislation is passed.154
The lack of support for the advancement of women in the United
States dates back to the culture at the time the U.S. government
was founded in the 1700s.155 Women had no role in its creation and
150. For example, the Netherlands. Country Comparison: The Netherlands, HOFSTEDE
INSIGHTS, https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/the-netherlands/ [https://
perma.cc/Z8WC-75YX].
151. Country Comparison: France, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, https://www.hofstede-insights.com/
country/france [https://perma.cc/MAD5-WGQD].
152. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate
Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 464 (2012) (questioning whether the same framing is
possible in the United States due to the absence of a “recognition of social partnerships between public and private institutions”).
153. See Country Comparison: France, supra note 151.
154. See Country Comparison: Italy, supra note 149.
155. See MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 3, at 1281-82. Unfortunately,
this culture still exists today. See id. at 1290-91. Although many argue that equal opportunity
exists, this is simply not true. See id. at 1284. The current legal system in the United States
not only allows but also enables white males to dominate when it comes to political and organizational seats of power. See id. We are only recently paying attention to how insufficient
many men are when it comes to leadership as compared to women. See Emma Jacobs, Why
Do So Many Incompetent Men Win at Work?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://
www.ft.com/content/3641f914-3433-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812 [https://perma.cc/MK8J-BSTF]
(“‘Women are better leaders,’ says Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic. ‘I am not neutral on this. I am
sexist in favour of women. Women have better people skills, [are] more altruistic, [and are]
better able to control their impulses. They outperform men in university at graduate and
undergraduate levels.’”). For a full discussion on the superiority of women in leadership roles,
see Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men [https://
perma.cc/ZDM9-VRC5].
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their voices were not considered.156 The United States was founded
by free white males who created a system in which only they were
considered equal.157 The EU, on the other hand, was created less
than three decades ago and kept the value of equality in mind in its
creation.158 In Part V, we more fully examine what this cultural
context means in terms of necessary steps for the United States to
achieve BGD.
II. INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM AS A SIGN OF CULTURAL CHANGE?
Given the lack of progress on BGD, a number of institutions holding economic power in the United States have taken action to
improve diversity through measures such as shareholder initiatives,
Initial Public Offering (IPO) pressure, exchange listing requirements, and state investment rules. This institutional activism may
be a sign of broader cultural change, indicating shifting norms
about how representation requirements are viewed.
A. Shareholder and Investor Initiatives
In 2018, BlackRock amended its proxy voting guidelines to add a
recommendation for boards to include at least two women directors
and indicated that it would consider withholding board approval
for companies that do not comply.159 BlackRock holds significant
economic power as the world’s largest asset manager with $6.3
trillion in assets under management.160 Its 2018 Proxy Guidelines
indicate that it “expects to see at least two women directors on every
board.”161 Vanguard, with over $5 billion in assets, has also
156. Mary Beth Norton, The Constitutional Status of Women in 1787, 6 MINN. J.L. & INEQ.
7, 7-8 (1988).
157. Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 465,
471-73 (1995); Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False when They
Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-american-de
mocracy.html [https://perma.cc/8T7G-PKR8].
158. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
159. Cydney Posner, BlackRock Issues Proxy Voting Guidelines for 2018 Proxy Season,
COOLEY PUBCO (Feb. 13, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/2018/02/13/blackrock-issues-proxyvoting-guidelines-for-2018-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/UL2N-UY6Z].
160. Id.
161. Belinda Martinez Vega, Why Businesses Are Adding Women to Their Boards, MERGERS
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advocated for BGD but has not indicated any penalties for a noncompliant slate.162
However, State Street Global Advisors, which manages $2.8 trillion in assets, did vote against slates on 511 companies that did not
comply with its gender diversity recommendations.163 In its recommendation, State Street noted that companies with a higher
percentage of women board members achieved higher levels of
return on equity (10.1 percent per year versus 7.4 percent for all
other companies).164 In July 2018, the Midwest Investors Diversity
Initiative, with $300 billion in assets, announced its attempt to
increase racial and gender diversity through model checklists and
best practices.165
Another private solution to increasing board gender diversity is
an investor-initiated requirement that private companies seeking
to become publicly held must increase the number of women on
their boards. In 2020, Goldman Sachs, a U.S. investment bank with
more than $1.8 trillion in assets under management,166 announced
that it would only carry out IPOs for companies that have at least
two diverse board members.167 This is an attempt to address the
& ACQUISITIONS (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.themiddlemarket.com/opinion/why-businessesare-adding-women-to-their-boards [https://perma.cc/K8GK-5LZW].
162. Id.
163. MIKE MAGSIG & JEANNE E. BRANTHOVER, DHR INT’L, BOARDROOM DIVERSITY: NOW IT’S
MID-CAPS’ TURN (2018), https://www.dhrinternational.com/insights/board-diversity-now-itsturn-mid-caps/ [https://perma.cc/S5LA-SUCF].
164. Press Release, State Street, State Street Global Advisors Calls on 3,500 Companies
Representing More Than $30 Trillion in Market Capitalization to Increase Number of Women
on Corporate Boards (Mar. 7, 2017), https://newsroom.statestreet.com/press-releases/pressrelease-details/2017/State-Street-Global-Advisors-Calls-on-3500-Companies-RepresentingMore-Than-30-Trillion-in-Market-Capitalization-to-Increase-Number-of-Women-onCorporate-Boards/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/XC6E-99RS].
165. Press Release, Midwest Investors Diversity Initiative, Midwest Investor Diversity
Initiative Reports 16 Companies Adopt Diverse Board Candidate Search Policies; Women,
Minorities Appointed at 6 Companies (July 12, 2018), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2018/07/12/1536800/0/en/Midwest-Investor-Diversity-Initiative-Reports-16Companies-Adopt-Diverse-Board-Candidate-Search-Policies-Women-Minorities-Appointed-at6-Companies.html [https://perma.cc/S3Z2-4LD9]. Glass Lewis, the leading independent
provider of global governance services, has also indicated that the company considers BGD
in its voting recommendations. GLASS LEWIS, APPROACH TO DIVERSITY DISCLOSURE RATINGS
3 (2020).
166. Consumer and Wealth Management, GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.goldmansachs.
com/careers/divisions/consumer-and-wealth-management/index.html [https://perma.cc/YZ4D3ZEN].
167. Goldman Sachs’ Commitment to Board Diversity, GOLDMAN SACHS (Feb. 4, 2020),
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gender and racial disparities on boards of privately held companies,
which are even more stark. A recent study found that of the most
heavily funded private companies, only 7 percent of board seats are
held by women and 60 percent of the companies do not have one
single woman on the board.168
Shifting the power to shareowners and investors could challenge
the status quo at companies by requiring transparency as it relates
to the gender and race of the board’s current directors.169 Further,
shareholders can place their own candidates on the ballot, creating
a system in which boards are more responsive to shareholders.170
This can reshape boards from the outside by expanding the network
to a broader range of candidates.171 While these measures may serve
as a signal to companies that investors value BGD, these measures
have not resulted in significant increases in women on boards.172
B. Nasdaq Listing Requirements
On December 1, 2020, Nasdaq’s female CEO Adena Friedman,
proposed a rule to the SEC that would mandate certain BGD requirements for public companies listed under its exchange.173 This
https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-commitments/diversity-and-inclusion/launch-with-gs/
pages/commitment-to-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/D7UT-MDTC]. But see Katie Mehnert,
Why Goldman Sachs’s Push for Diversity Is Unlikely to Drive Real Change, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 20, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/02/why-goldman-sachss-push-for-diversity-is-unlikely-todrive-real-change [https://perma.cc/NW35-TYCT]. According to a Goldman Sachs representative, a “diverse” director is one “from a traditionally underrepresented group[ ], including
gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender identity.” Jena McGregor, Goldman
Sachs CEO Says It Won’t Take a Company Public Without Diversity on Its Board, WASH. POST
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/23/goldman-sachs-ceosays-it-wont-take-companies-public-without-diverse-board-member/ [https://perma. cc/H39WHKDW].
168. Gené Teare, 2019 Study of Gender Diversity in Private Company Boardrooms,
CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Dec. 11, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/2019-study-of-genderdiversity-in-private-company-boardrooms/ [https://perma.cc/U3MX-Q2KD].
169. See Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 234-35.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Teresa L. Johnson & Amy Endicott, United States: Institutional Investors’ Role in
Diversifying Boardrooms, MONDAQ (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
shareholders/1016848/institutional-investors39-role-in-diversifying-boardrooms?
[https://perma.cc/F8BZ-5Z8W].
173. Pippa Stevens, Nasdaq Proposal Would Require Greater Diversity on Company Boards,
CNBC (Dec. 2, 2020, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/01/nasdaq-proposal-would-
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rule was approved by the SEC on August 6, 2021.174 To comply with
the rule, listed companies must either: (1) have at least one racial
minority or LGBTQ+ board member and one female director; or (2)
provide a sufficient explanation as to why the company has not met
this requirement.175 The rule also requires Nasdaq-listed companies to annually publish statistical information regarding their
directors.176 The rule aims to provide greater transparency to investors and more data to assess board diversity trends.177
This is an example of an institution using its power to promote
gender equity despite the lack of legislative and cultural support. It
also illustrates the potential impact of women gaining access to
leadership. Nasdaq’s proposed rule would presumably have a broad
impact, encouraging thousands of companies listed on its stock
exchange to include women, racial minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals on their boards. If successful, this bold move has the
potential to normalize women, and particularly women of color, in
these leadership roles, which could also promote broader cultural
change.
C. State Investment Funds
A number of public and private state pension and retirement
funds have also indicated that they will withhold votes for boards
when they do not contain at least 30 percent women. California’s
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) requires that

require-companies-to-have-greater-diversity-on-boards.html [https://perma.cc/4P6V-94PJ].
174. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board
Diversity and to Offer Certain Listed Companies Access to a Complimentary Board Recruiting
Service, Exchange Act Release No. 92,590, 86 Fed. Reg. 44,424 (Aug. 12, 2021); Nasdaq’s
Board Diversity Rule: What Nasdaq-Listed Companies Should Know, NASDAQ LISTING CTR.
(Aug. 17, 2021), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/Board%20Diversity%20Disclosure%20
Five%20Things.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7QF-H5TA].
175. Stevens, supra note 173. Those self-identifying as “Black or African American, Hispanic or Latinx, Asian, Native American or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
or [t]wo or [m]ore [r]aces or [e]thnicities” are considered to be an “underrepresented minority.”
Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq to Advance Diversity Through New Proposed Listing Requirements (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-to-advance-diversitythrough-new-proposed-listing-requirements-2020-12-01 [https://perma.cc/49FW-8TZD].
176. Id.
177. See id.
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companies disclose their board’s diversity policy.178 The California
State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) threatened that it
would publicly institute a shareholder initiative to address lack of
diversity for 126 California corporations with all-male boards if they
did not appoint at least one woman.179
Pension funds in Massachusetts have also issued proxy guidelines
that recommend voting against board slates if less than 35 percent
of the board is diverse.180 The powerful New York State Common
Retirement Fund, responsible for managing $247.7 billion in assets
invested across more than four hundred companies, has also indicated that it would vote against any slate of directors up for reelection if there were no female directors on the company’s board.181
For companies with only one woman on the board, the Fund
indicated it would vote against any directors up for re-election to the
governance committee.182 Rhode Island is another state that has
announced a proxy voting initiative that requires companies benefitting from state pension fund investments to diversify their
boards.183 The state warned that it would vote against any slate of
directors nominated by a company that would result in a board on
which women or racial minorities hold any less than 30 percent of
the seats.184

178. CALPERS, CALPERS’ GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES 16 (2019), https://
www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainability-principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9JF-GEP7].
179. See Letter from John Chiang, Cal. State Treasurer, to Rob Feckner, Bd. President,
CalPERS Bd. of Admin., & Harry Keiley, Chair, CalSTRS Tchrs. Ret. Bd. (Feb. 19, 2015),
https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2015/20150219_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 9ZDD2AUY].
180. Diversity & Inclusion, MASS PRIM, https://www.ai-cio.com/news/massachusettspension-fund-increases-corporate-diversity-standards/ [https://perma.cc/3J3B-AVLW].
181. See Press Release, Off. N.Y. State Comptroller, NY State Comptroller DiNapoli Calls
on Corporate America to Address Lack of Diversity, Equity & Inclusion (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/2021/02/ny-state-comptroller-dinapoli-callscorporate-america-address-lack-diversity-equity-inclusion [https://perma.cc/WVW4-RAZ9].
182. See id.
183. See Proxy Voting Guidelines, R.I. OFF. GEN. TREASURER (Sept. 26, 2018), https://d10k
7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5c08053023f8124fa8129f50/Existing_Rhode_Island_
Proxy_Policy_Matrix_2016_Proposed_Exec_Comp___version_2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRB9545S].
184. Id.
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D. Backlash to Activism
In the United States, these institutional efforts to ensure equality
for women face immense resistance due to the cultural factors discussed in Part I.185 For example, there is a consistent historical
record of conservative forces mobilizing against affirmations of
women’s rights and equality as a threat to the family.186 Initiatives
to increase the representation of women in important decisionmaking roles are perceived as a threat to those who enjoy the privileges of an unequal system.187 With gender equality, white men
would no longer hold such disproportionate wealth, power, and control over the U.S. economy and democracy.188 They therefore
commonly critique parity models as “social engineering” that force
women to be out of the house more and men into the house, challenging traditional societal norms.189 Even when these BGD
initiatives are actions of private organizations, they are often still
challenged as unconstitutional, just as the legislative efforts are,
which is discussed further in Part III.C below.190
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. See Ruth Rubio-Marín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and
Why It Won’t Fly in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 99, 120 (2012); see also Kate
Lyons, Rise of the “Strongman”: Dozens of Female World Leaders Warn Women’s Rights Being
Eroded, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/
28/rise-of-the-strongman-dozens-of-female-world-leaders-warn-womens-rights-being-eroded
[https://perma.cc/F9W7-5JVQ].
187. See Rubio-Marín, supra note 186, at 121-23. This is not a surprise given there are
many men who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo with women providing
unpaid labor in service of men in both the home and workplace. See Heather Marcoux &
Jamie Orsini, The Unpaid Work Women Do Adds up to $10.8 Trillion per Year, MOTHERLY
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.mother.ly/state-of-motherhood/the-value-of-unpaid-care-work-bywomen-is-10-8-trillion [https://perma.cc/4N7U-ZSRJ].
188. See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
189. Rubio-Marín, supra note 186, at 121. In fact, many warn that women lost ground after
the election of Donald Trump. See Emily Olson, How Two Years of Donald Trump Have
Shaped Women’s Rights in the US, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://www.abc.net.
au/news/2019-01-19/donald-trumps-presidency-two-years-shaped-womens-rights-us/10728882
[https://perma.cc/7AP6-QWH5]; see also Nathan Robinson, Rich White Men Rule America.
How Much Longer Will We Tolerate That?, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/20/rich-white-men-rule-america-minority-rule
[https://perma.cc/MEN2-4273] (“The core democratic principle is that people should have a
meaningful say in political decisions that affect their lives. In Alabama, we’ve just seen what
the opposite of democracy looks like: 25 white male Republicans in the state senate were able
to ban almost all abortion in the state.”).
190. See infra Part III.C.
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III. U.S. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO INCREASE BOARD DIVERSITY
Although no federal law or initiative has been formally proposed,191 some states have begun to take action. In 2018, California
passed a law requiring increases in female representation on corporate boards headquartered in California.192 A number of states have
also passed nonbinding initiatives to enhance diversity on boards.193
A. California SB 826
California became the first U.S. state to mandate BGD for corporate boards on September 30, 2018.194 California SB 826 reaches
all public companies with headquarters in California, amounting to
12 percent of all public U.S. firms and over $5 trillion in market
share.195 The bill requires all companies within scope to have at
least one female director by the end of 2019.196 By 2021, boards with
five members must have at least two female directors and those
with six or more members must have three female directors.197
California SB 826 was preceded by a 2013 regulation setting a
voluntary goal of one woman on each board by 2016.198 This was the
first nonbinding resolution passed by any state, requiring all public
corporations in California with nine or more director seats to have
at least three women on the board, firms with five to eight seats to
have at least two women on the board, and corporations with fewer

191. Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires firms to explain whether and how
they “consider[ ] diversity in identifying nominees for director.” See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010). However, the Act does not require firms to consider diversity, nor
does it define what diversity means. See, e.g., id.
192. Daniel Greene, Vincent J. Intintoli & Kathleen M. Kahle, Do Board Gender Quotas
Affect Firm Value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826, 60 J. CORP. FIN., no. 101526,
2020, at 1.
193. See infra Part III.B.
194. Greene et al., supra note 192, at 1.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 1.
197. Id.
198. See S. Con. Res. 62, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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than five seats to have a minimum of one woman.199 No meaningful
gains resulted from the voluntary measure by the end of the threeyear time frame, leading to the firmer requirements in SB 826.200
Under SB 826, if a company headquartered in California fails to
achieve these goals, the company will be fined an amount equal to
the average cash compensation for directors for the first violation
and three times that amount for each additional violation.201 There
is a fine of $100,000 for a first violation and $300,000 for a subsequent violation.202 There are also fines for failure to report.203
In 2019, 625 publicly held companies identified that their principal executive officers were located in California.204 However, only
330 of those companies filed a 2019 California Publicly Traded
Corporate Disclosure Statement, which would indicate whether or
not they were in compliance with the BGD regulation.205 Of the 330
companies, 282 reported compliance, which was up from 173 in July
2019.206 Since California passed the BGD legislation, 511 women have been added to corporate boards in the state.207 However,

199. Id.
200. S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301.3,
301.4, 2115.5 (West 2021)).
201. Pamela M. Harper, Corporate Board Diversity: Gaining Traction Through Investor
Stewardship, BUS. L. TODAY (July 16, 2018), https://businesslawtoday.org/2018/07/corporateboard-diversity-gaining-traction-investor-stewardship/ [https://perma.cc/B9UJ-JVYT].
202. Cal. S.B. 826. The law requires public companies with boards of six or more directors
to have at least three women directors. New California Law Requires Representation of
Women on Public Company Boards, FENWICK (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.fenwick.com/
insights/publications/new-california-law-requires-representation-of-women-on-publiccompany-boards [https://perma.cc/GS2B-UFXS]. Because “[e]ach required director seat not
held by a requisite woman shall count as a separate violation,” an all-male board of this size
could face three violations per year, amounting to a fine between $700,000 and $900,000. Id.
203. Cal. S.B. 826 (“For failure to timely file board member information with the Secretary
of State ... $100,000.”).
204. ALEX PADILLA, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, WOMEN ON BOARDS: MARCH 2020 REPORT (2020),
https://bpd.cdn.sos.ca.gov/women-on-boards/wob-report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HES5CVWV].
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also Lily Jamali, A Push to Get More Women on Corporate Boards Gains Momentum, NPR (Mar. 5, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/05/811192459/a-push-toget-more-women-on-corporate-boards-gains-momentum [https://perma.cc/4U2T-V4DR].
207. Jeff Green, California Law Adds Women to Boards but Leaves Latinas Behind,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2020, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-02/
california-law-adds-women-to-boards-but-leaves-latinas-behind [https://perma.cc/X5BKN3QE].
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despite being the fastest-growing ethnic group in the state, Latinas
are not proportionately represented in the new class of female board
members.208 Hispanics make up 39 percent of California’s population, yet the data show that Latina women only gained 17 seats,
which is 3.3 percent of the newly appointed members.209 White
women gained 398 seats (78 percent), Asian women were selected
for 59 seats (11.5 percent), and Black women were appointed to 27
new seats (5.3 percent).210
Despite criticism of SB 826, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New
Jersey were also considering BGD legislation in 2019.211 In August
2019, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed a law that requires
companies based in Illinois to report the number of women and
racial minorities on their boards and indicate plans to increase
diversity.212 An original version of the bill required every company
headquartered in Illinois to have at least one woman, Black, and
Latino board member, but that did not make it to the final bill.213
B. Nonbinding State Resolutions
In the United States, while no state except California has enacted
a BGD quota, a number of states have encouraged companies to
enhance board diversity. One strategy that has been recommended
is setting “voluntary targets,” which is a common counterargument
to legislated quotas.214 Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Jessica Guynn, #MeToo for the Boardroom: California Gender Diversity Law Could
Lead to More Women Quotas Nationally, USA TODAY (July 9, 2020, 6:28 PM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/money/2019/12/30/california-gender-diversity-law-could-lead-more-womenquotas/2753270001/ [https://perma.cc/YXH3-WNJQ]; see, e.g., S.B. 115, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2019) (“[A] publicly held domestic corporation or foreign corporation whose principal
executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in this state must
have a minimum of 1 female director on its board.”).
212. Mary Ellen Podmolik & Dan Petrella, Pritzker Signs Stripped-Down Corporate Diversity Bill, Calls It a ‘Big First Step’, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-biz-corporate-board-diversity-law-20190827-q73cqjxmcrftfjwfcrlx4upgny-story.
html [https://perma.cc/3AXD-99UE].
213. Id.
214. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-30, CORPORATE BOARDS: STRATEGIES
TO ADDRESS REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 21
(2015).
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have each passed nonbinding resolutions regarding gender diversity
on corporate boards.215 However well-intentioned, these measures
have not increased BGD, as acknowledged in the comments to
California SB 826.216
For example, in April 2017, the Pennsylvania House introduced
House Resolution 273 with the intention of encouraging “equitable
and diverse gender representation on ... boards and in senior management of companies in Pennsylvania.”217 The resolution noted that
in 2016, women held “12.7% of executive positions in the largest 100
public companies headquartered in Pennsylvania,” despite making
up 47 percent of the U.S. workforce.218 In 2016, the City of Pittsburgh created a Gender Equity Commission, aimed at redressing
gender discrimination.219 Pittsburgh based its Gender Equity Commission on the principles of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).220 CEDAW is also ratified in the Pittsburgh Code.221
In 2014, New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer and the New
York City Pensions Fund created the Boardroom Accountability
Project (BAP).222 The project was aimed at “increasing investor involvement in determining the make-up of corporate boards.”223 The
BAP entered a second phase, BAP 2.0, which focused on increasing
the pressure on companies to make their boards “diverse, independent, and climate competent.”224 BAP 2.0 discussed diversity as a
“strategy for economic success.”225 To demand transparency, the
project asked 151 publicly held companies to provide a board “matrix” identifying “the gender and race/ethnicity of individual

215. Diversity Considerations, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.clearygott
lieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/diversity-considerations-bod-2019 [https://
perma.cc/6MFS-CDSY].
216. S. RULES COMM., CORPORATIONS: BOARD OF DIRECTORS, S.B. 826, at 4 (Cal. 2018).
217. Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 232.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 235; see Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 34-2016, § 1 (Dec. 13, 2016) (codified in
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. I, art. IX, ch. 177c (2019)).
220. Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 235.
221. Id.; PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. I, art. IX, ch. 177C (2019).
222. Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 233.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 233-34.
225. Id. at 234.
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directors on the board.”226 In June 2018, over eighty-five of the BAP
companies reported “adopt[ing] improved processes and increased
transparency.”227 BAP also initiated “a proxy access campaign that
would give ‘large, long-term shareowners,’ the power to ‘nominate
corporate board candidates on a company’s ballot.’”228 In December
2018, New York City hosted the first public meeting of the Commission on Gender Equity to address issues of inequality and
discrimination.229
While resolutions are important symbols, they have not led to an
increase in BGD in the United States.230 Additionally, these statelevel measures do not provide any type of enforcement mechanism,
which is the most effective means to accomplish change.231
C. Backlash to Legislation
As discussed in Part I.C, U.S. culture is low on uncertainty avoidance, so rules are many times resisted and perceived as overly
restrictive on free will.232 This explains why lawsuits were immediately filed to invalidate California’s BGD requirement. One of the
plaintiff’s suits alleged that the statute discriminates against men
and serves no important government interest because “[s]ex-based
balancing is not an important government interest that can sustain
a sex-based classification under the Equal Protection Clause.”233

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235; see About the Commission on Gender Equity, N.Y.C. COMM’N ON GENDER
EQUITY, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/genderequity/about/about.page [https://perma.cc/4TVGLYCV].
230. See Tracy A. Thomas, Reconsidering the Remedy of Gender Quotas, HARV. J.L. &
GENDER ONLINE 13 (2016), https://harvardjlg.com/2016/11/reconsidering-the-remedy-ofgender-quotas/ [https://perma.cc/RNF5-69F3].
231. See id.
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. See Cydney Posner, Federal District Court Dismisses a Challenge to California Board
Gender Diversity Statute, COOLEY PUBCO (Apr. 21, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/04/
21/court-dismisses-challenge-to-sb-826/ [https://perma.cc/BL6N-UNTW] (discussing Meland
v. Padilla, which was filed by a conservative legal group seeking to strike down the California
quota law). Essentially, the plaintiff argued that requiring one woman to be named to the
board of a corporation of which he is a shareholder infringed on his right to vote for an allmale board. See id.
226.
227.
228.
229.
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Opponents of SB 826 also claim that the requirements are in
violation of the internal affairs doctrine.234 Although “California has
codified the internal affairs doctrine, the bill analysis for SB 826”
points to past incidents in which California courts “ignored the internal affairs doctrine in certain instances and, therefore, the rule
is not absolute.”235 Opponents have also argued that the California
legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the corresponding provision of the California Constitution, because “the bill creates an express gender classification.”236
In the United States, the accepted constitutional interpretation
is that gender “quotas on the basis of sex violate formal equality
and a gender neutral reading of the Equal Protection Clause.”237 The
resistance to formal requirements and legislation that would enhance women’s power can be traced to the individualist culture in
the United States discussed in Part I.C.238 This tradition is rooted
in “autonomy and meritocracy as expressed through the free functioning of the market and of social forces, including capital and
political parties, that constitutional provisions such as First Amendment associational rights of political parties help to protect.”239 This
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause does not acknowledge
the reality that “formal equality” is an illusion that masks failures
to achieve substantive equality.240 Once you blow the smoke away
from the mirror, the continuing historical, individual, institutional,
and cultural subordination of women is glaringly clear.241 A requirement to remain “gender-neutral” to preserve a fictitious
equality is a mechanism to preserve the status quo of a maledominated society.242

234. Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 228.
235. Id.
236. Id. The Court dismissed Meland v. Padilla because the conservative organization that
brought the suit lacked standing. See Posner, supra note 233.
237. Rubio-Marín, supra note 186, at 121.
238. Id. at 122.
239. Id. Although affirmative action programs were initially considered appropriate to
address historical discrimination, more recent cases have limited these programs’ applicability. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 303 (2013).
240. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality, supra note 3, at 6-7.
241. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 3, at 1286.
242. See id. at 1284, 1286.
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Although BGD requirements are the most promising path to
gender equality as further discussed infra, there remains the likelihood of a constitutional objection based on this resistance to legally
required gender mandates.243 For example, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, decided in 1978 with respect to
college admissions quotas, the Court invalidated the quotas for the
stated reason that increasing racial minorities in the medical
profession was not a legitimate state purpose.244 Later cases, however, have indicated that minority status can be considered in
college admission, as long as the consideration is “narrowly tailored”
to further a “compelling governmental interest” and quotas are not
used.245 Quotas have been upheld to permit a set percentage of
government contracts being awarded to minority-owned businesses.246 The Department of Labor requires federal contractors to take
affirmative steps to strive for specific targets or goals in hiring
women, people of color, individuals with disabilities, and covered
veterans.247
While race-based quotas are subject to strict scrutiny, genderbased quotas are subject to the lesser standard of intermediate
243. For a discussion on the constitutionality of the California law, see Vikram David Amar
& Jason Mazzone, Is California’s Mandate That Public Companies Include Women on Their
Boards of Directors Constitutional?, VERDICT (Oct. 5, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/
2018/10/05/is-californias-mandate-that-public-companies-include-women-on-their-boards-ofdirectors-constitutional [https://perma.cc/DHU3-JRPS].
244. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding that the use
of racial quotas in admissions decisions at a public university was unconstitutional); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (holding that race
is subject to a standard of strict scrutiny requiring that the specific policy be necessary to
achieve the benefits of diversity and that no race-neutral option would achieve the same
benefits).
245. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327, 334 (2003) (noting that strict scrutiny is
required for affirmative action cases, but that considering diversity as a factor is not unconstitutional because fostering diversity in higher education is a compelling governmental
interest).
246. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453, 492 (1980) (upholding 10 percent
quota for minority contractors); see also Minority Business Development: State MBE Certification Programs, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/labor-and-employment/minority-business-development.aspx [https://perma.cc/
N2DQ-TSMJ]. But see City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507, 511 (1989)
(overturning a 30 percent minority contractor law because it was not narrowly tailored to
remedying past discrimination).
247. See Affirmative Action, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/hiring/
affirmativeact [https://perma.cc/FTM3-YHX2].
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scrutiny.248 The intermediate scrutiny standard was developed in
Craig v. Boren.249 This was one of the cases that Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, while still an attorney, curated to address gender discrimination by choosing male plaintiffs to cater to an audience of
male Justices.250 Craig challenged an Oklahoma law which prohibited males under the age of twenty-one from purchasing 3.2 percent
beer but permitted females over the age of eighteen to do so.251 The
Court invalidated the statute under the Equal Protection Clause
because the state was unable to prove that the law “serve[d]
important governmental objectives and [was] substantially related
to [the] achievement of those objectives.”252
With respect to California SB 826, the Ninth Circuit could rely on
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. City and County
of San Francisco to support the quota as serving the important governmental objective of correcting past discrimination on corporate
boards.253 However, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the exact
standard to be applied and will more likely rely on the Equal Protection Clause to rule that women may not be given preferential
treatment under any circumstances, even when there is a long history of discrimination against women and the differences in numbers cannot be justified by merit.254 While it seems clear to some
that increasing the number of women in prominent decision-making

248. See Anisa A. Somani, Note, The Use of Gender Quotas in America: Are Voluntary Party
Quotas the Way to Go?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1451, 1474 (2013) (“For example, the Ninth
Circuit, in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, upheld an affirmative action program for women by applying intermediate scrutiny and struck down a similar program for members of minority races by applying strict scrutiny.”).
249. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
250. Stephanie Buck, The On the Basis of Sex Story Wasn’t the Only Time Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Used Cases About Men to Argue for Women’s Equality, TIME (Dec. 24, 2018, 12:00
PM), https://time.com/5481422/rbg-movie-male-plaintiff-history/ [https://perma.cc/RH6HR99J].
251. See 429 U.S. at 191-92.
252. Id. at 197.
253. See 813 F.2d 922, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1987).
254. This is especially likely to be true given the current composition of the Supreme Court.
See Laura Bronner & Elena Mejía, The Supreme Court’s Conservative Supermajority Is Just
Beginning to Flex Its Muscles, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 2, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/the-supreme-courts-conservative-supermajority-is-just-beginning-to-flex-its-muscles/
[https://perma.cc/L5BW-QATS].
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roles is an important governmental objective,255 there are those, including members of the Supreme Court, who would prefer to keep
women in background roles in the home and workplace to support
men who have the ultimate decision-making power.256
IV. ANALYSIS OF EU APPROACH TO IMPROVING BOARD DIVERSITY
Unlike the United States, the EU acknowledges both the business
and social rationales for increasing BGD.257 While women in the
United States currently hold only 23.1 percent of publicly held board
seats,258 the EU fares better at 30 percent overall.259 While the EU
has long encouraged voluntary measures to increase female participation on boards, a number of member states have also legally
mandated BGD requirements.260 Several recent studies have
observed that corporate boards are more diverse in countries “with
formal quotas, codes, and disclosure requirements promoting gender

255. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 378-79.
256. See Jason Sattler, Don’t Reward Republicans for Brett Kavanaugh and the Politics of
Personal Annihilation, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2018, 7:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2018/10/07/brett-kavanaugh-help-supreme-court-shrink-womens-rightscolumn/1551654002/ [https://perma.cc/KFW9-3BZP]; cf. Amy Matsui & Sarah Lipton-Lubet,
Judge Neil Gorsuch’s Record on Women’s Legal Rights, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Mar. 29,
2017), https://nwlc.org/blog/judge-neil-gorsuchs-record-on-womens-legal-rights/ [https://perma.
cc/98MU-D3HY].
257. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Union of
Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, at 15, COM (2020) 152 final (Mar. 5, 2020)
(“The inclusion of a gender perspective in all EU policies and processes is essential to reach
the goal of gender equality. Gender mainstreaming ensures that policies and programmes
maximise the potential of all—women and men, girls and boys, in all their diversity. The aim
is to redistribute power, influence and resources in a fair and gender-equal way, tackling
inequality, promoting fairness, and creating opportunity.”).
258. See Erin Lehr, Q3 2020 Gender Diversity Index, EQUILAR (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.equilar.com/reports/76-q3-2020-equilar-gender-diversity-index.html
[https://perma.cc/35MY-AFMZ]. This figure demonstrates only a small increase from the 17.7
percent figure representing decades of stagnation. 2020 WOMEN ON BDS., GENDER DIVERSITY
INDEX: 2018 PROGRESS OF WOMEN CORPORATE DIRECTORS BY COMPANY SIZE, STATE AND
INDUSTRY SECTOR 2 (2018), https://2020wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2020WOB_
GDI_Report_2018_ FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEV2-PK85].
259. Largest Listed Companies: Presidents, Board Members and Employee Representatives, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. (Nov. 11, 2020), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/
dgs/indicator/wmidm_bus_bus__wmid_comp_compbm [https://perma.cc/5FKU-27YV].
260. See infra Part IV.A.
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equity.”261 For example, a global study of women on boards found
that firms located in countries with “compulsory quotas attained
greater overall gender diversity at the board level, with 71.8%
having at least 30% female directors as of October 31, 2019.”262 In
2019, most companies in the EU subject to legislated BGD requirements had actually exceeded those mandates.263 Italy and France
led the way with the most companies actually exceeding the female
director requirements among MSCI ACWI Index constituents.264
Voluntary targets have a weaker correlation to gender diversity
in the EU.265 Of the companies listed in the MSCI ACWI Index that
are located in countries without any elective or compulsory gender
requirements, 23.0 percent had all-male boards and only 20.3
percent had reached a female director threshold of 30 percent.266 In
Western Europe, more specifically, a number of regulatory measures were enacted in 2010 and 2011 (with Spain in 2007) to
address the lack of female representation in seats of power in business.267 As a result, women on boards in the EU increased from 11.9
percent in 2010 to 26.7 percent in 2018.268 Today, women comprise
33 percent of board members of the STOXX Europe 600.269
Because voluntary measures have not improved BGD significantly, governments have enacted treaties and legislation that promote the placement of women on boards with the goal to increase
opportunities for women.270 Prior to this paradigm shift, there was
a “large gap between the proportion of employed and well-educated
women and those sitting on boards of EU companies” in EU member states.271 Now, numerous treaties in the EU promote equality
261. See Griffin et al., supra note 126, at 134.
262. See EMELIANOVA & MILHOMEM, supra note 51, at 8 (footnote omitted).
263. Just over 57 percent exceeded requirements by October 31, 2019. See id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See EUR. COMM’N, 2019 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN THE EU
26-27 (2019), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f3dd1274-7788-11e9-9f0501aa75ed71a1/ [https://perma.cc/SD2H-3YTS].
268. See id.
269. EUR. WOMEN ON BDS., EUROPEAN WOMEN ON BOARDS GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 2019
4 (2020), https://europeanwomenonboards.eu/portfolio/gdi-2019/ [https://perma.cc/A3LBPFFX].
270. See infra Part IV.A.
271. See Tyler Winters & Madhuri Jacobs-Sharma, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards:
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between men and women.272 The European Institute for Gender
Equality has established a number of objectives involving the gender pay gap, female labor market participation, combating gender
violence, and “[p]romoting equality in decision-making.”273 Growing
legislation in the EU also acknowledges that increasing the
representation of women in important decision-making roles in both
politics and economics is key to achieving gender equality.274
Our analysis builds on previous studies by examining the EU
approach to BGD to analyze three categories of information relevant
to successfully increasing women’s representation on corporate
boards: legislative, cultural, and constitutional factors.275 First, we
review components of the laws mandating BGD and assess how they
relate to achieving their mandate (legislative factors). The specific
legislative factors we account for include what type of BGD requirement was used, how many years companies had to comply, and the
penalty for failure to meet the requirement. Second, we identify the
cultural dimensions of the countries that adopted BGD mandates
beyond just the masculinity and power distance scores, to also
The Competing Perspectives in the U.S. and the EU 22 (Apr. 27, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
fisch_2016/13/ [https://perma.cc/GDY8-473B].
272. See TFEU, supra note 12, arts. 8, 153, 157 (stating powers of EU institutions and
rights of EU citizens); TEU, supra note 12, arts. 2-3 (establishing powers of EU institutions
and rights of its citizens).
273. See Gender Statistics Database: EU Policies and Strategies, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER
EQUAL. (2021), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/browse/eustrat [https://perma.cc/
3BZ3-9R8Q].
274. See infra Part IV.A.
275. See generally Heike Mensi-Klarbach & Cathrine Seierstad, Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards: Similarities and Differences in Quota Scenarios, 17 EUR. MGMT. REV. 615
(2020); Giulia Ferrari, Valeria Ferraro, Paola Profeta & Chiara Pronzato, Do Board Gender
Quotas Matter? Selection, Performance and Stock Market Effects (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ.,
Discussion Paper No. 11462, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11462.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FXKKNJH]; Linda Senden, The Multiplicity of Regulatory Responses to Remedy the Gender Imbalance on Company Boards, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 51 (2014); Rohini Pande & Deanna Ford,
Gender Quotas and Female Leadership, WORLD DEV. REP. 1 (2012), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/9120 [https://perma.cc/EM5X-V8QB]. In a study conducted by
Laura Cabeza-García and her colleagues, the authors examined differences among countries
whose BGD legislation included a penalty for failing to meet BGD requirements and
concluded that the best results were found in countries with lower levels of masculinity and
power distance. See Cabeza-García et al., supra note 125, at 57 (examining BGD laws in
Norway, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK). The work of Julie C. Suk and
Christopher McCrudden, who discovered the connection between constitutional language and
positive measures to increase BGD, is discussed and built upon in Part V.
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include uncertainty avoidance (cultural factors).276 Third, and as it
turns out, most critically, we investigate the extent to which positive
action is constitutionally authorized by examining the wording of
the equality amendments to these countries’ constitutions (constitutional factors). The factors relating to the constitutional dimension
are (1) the extent to which positive action is permitted or required
based on the language and (2) judicial interpretation of that language. The Appendix summarizes these legislative, cultural, and
constitutional factors for the eight EU countries with legislated
BGD requirements.
A. Legislative
In 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, outlined her new political objective to promote gender
equality.277 As part of this strategy, she called for the adoption of the
EU Directive, which sought to establish a BGD requirement for all
member states.278 The directive had stalled in the EU Council under
previous leadership.279 Even though there is no national requirement to do so, a number of EU member states have enacted their
own regulations.280 There are eight countries in the EU that have
enacted BGD requirements.281 These include Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.282
Below we analyze the efficacy of these regulations based on multiple
legislative features.
France has embraced egalitarianism and sought to increase the
participation of women in decision-making roles through legisla-

276. See Agata Maida & Andrea Weber, Female Leadership and Gender Gap Within Firms:
Evidence from an Italian Board Reform (IZA Inst. Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 12099,
2019), http://ftp.iza.org/dp12099.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV8S-N5C6].
277. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Questions and Answers: Gender Equality Strategy
2020-2025 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_
357 [https://perma.cc/ZF44-QTL5].
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Kimberly A. Houser & Jamillah Bowman Williams, Appendix , https://wmlawreview.
org/appendix-board-gender-diversity-path-achieving-substantive-equality-united-states
[https://perma.cc/HA45-8UG9].
281. Id.
282. Id.
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tion.283 France is also one of the few countries receiving top marks
for its legal infrastructure on gender equality from the World
Bank.284 In addition to establishing quotas in many areas, France
has also increased legal remedies for women encountering obstacles
to advancement, broadened the definition of sexual harassment,
and increased penalties and remedies.285 As of 2017, France required 40 percent representation of women on boards of all publicly
traded companies, all companies with more than five hundred
employees (250 after 2020), and companies with net sales or total
assets of at least €50 million.286 The penalty for failure to comply
includes an invalidation of the appointment and a loss of fees for
directors on noncompliant boards.287 Between 2011, the year the
BGD quota was first enacted, and 2019, female representation rose
from 21.6 percent to 45.3 percent.288 The increase in female participation on boards in France provided “an improvement in the
stability of director-firm matches and a consequent reduction in the
female directors’ turnover, due to the change in the directors’ selection process triggered by the quota.”289
283. See Eléonore Lépinard, The Adoption and Diffusion of Gender Quotas in France (19822014) 1 (Eur. U. Inst. Dep’t of L., Working Paper No. 2015/19, 2015), https://cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/35579/LAW_2015_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/73A2-DEHA] (“Once a
country allergic to any policy that would look like affirmative action for women or any other
social group, let alone quotas with fixed targets, France has transformed in less than a decade
(2006-2014) in the land of gender quotas [in] ... corporate boards of medium and large firms,
supervisory boards of public institutions, professional organizations, sports federations, regional socio-economic councils and, last but not least, most of elected political bodies.”).
284. Of the eight countries with a score of 100 in gender equity, seven—Belgium, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Sweden—are part of the EU and European Economic Area (EEA), “meaning that women are on an equal legal standing with men across all
eight indicators.” See WORLD BANK GRP., WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2020, 6 (2020),
https://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9781464815324 [https://perma.cc/DUZ3UEVB].
285. See L. Camille Hébert, Dignity and Discrimination in Sexual Harassment Law: A
French Case Study, 25 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3, 15-22, 33 (2018).
286. See Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la representation équilibrée des femmes
et des hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionelle [Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on the Balanced Representation of Women and
Men on Boards of Directors, Supervisory Boards, and Professional Equality], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011,
p. 1680.
287. See id.
288. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
289. See G.S.F. Bruno, A. Ciavarella & N. Linciano, Boardroom Gender Diversity and
Performance of Listed Companies in Italy 9 (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa,

542

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:497

In 2011, Italy instituted a law mandating that for the first board
election after August 2012, at least 20 percent of the seats would be
held by the lesser-represented gender and that 33 percent would be
achieved during the following two terms.290 Italy has the most
severe potential penalties, with fines and loss of director’s fees.291
The penalty for listed companies’ failure to comply range from
€100,000 to €1,000,000, with potential dissolution for failure to
comply after warnings.292 In 2019, legislation was introduced that
required companies to ensure that no more than three-fifths of
“board appointments from 2020 forward” were men.293 Between 2011
and 2019, BGD rose from 5.9 percent to 36.1 percent for Italian
listed companies.294 Not only did the BGD law with penalties vastly
increase female representation on publicly held boards, but research
also demonstrates that the quality of boards was also improved.
Boards in Italy have more degree-holding members, greater age
diversity, increased board attendance rates, and an increase in measures of corporate profitability when women board representation
increases beyond 17-20 percent.295
Although Spain implemented a board gender diversity law earlier
than many other member states, it is nonbinding and imposes no
consequences for failure to comply.296 In 2007, Spain instituted a 40
percent gender quota by 2015 for publicly held companies with more
than 250 employees.297 Rather than using penalties for failure to
comply, Spain offered incentives such as state contracts for those
who did achieve this goal.298 In 2014, the Corporate Enterprises Act
was amended to require both public and private corporations to set
Working Paper No. 87, 2018), https://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/wp87.pdf/d733
b58a-44b4-42de-98c7-3c89a82a0182 [https://perma.cc/VQR5-KTHB].
290. See Legge 12 luglio 2011, n.120, G.U. July 28, 2011, n.174 (It.) (amending the text
relating to financial intermediation).
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See More Women in Italian Boardrooms, but Fewer Female CEOs, REUTERS (Apr. 6,
2021, 1:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-companies-gender/more-women-initalian-boardrooms-but-fewer-female-ceos-idUSKBN2BT2GU [https://perma.cc/4SZN-CWNF].
294. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
295. See Bruno et al., supra note 289, at 10, 26, 37.
296. See Law for the Effective Equality of Women and Men art. 75 (B.O.E. 2007, 71) (Spain)
(electing quota legislation on corporate boards in Spain).
297. See id.
298. See id. art. 34.
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minimum targets for BGD.299 In 2015, the Good Corporate
Governance Code of Listed Companies set forth a goal of 30 percent
BGD by 2020 on a “comply or explain” basis and required board
composition to be reported in companies’ annual reports.300 Because
there are no consequences for the failure to explain, some give no
reason at all in their corporate governance reports.301 Between 2007
and 2019 female representation on corporate boards increased from
6.2 percent to 26.2 percent, which was a substantial increase, yet
never came close to meeting the 40 percent requirement.302
In 2015, Germany instituted a 30 percent quota for both men and
women on the supervisory board of publicly held corporations effective January 1, 2016.303 This rule requires that companies with less
than 30 percent women on their board fill the next available open
seat with a woman or leave the seat open until it can be filled with
a woman.304 Despite the very short time periods, Germany was able
to meet the BGD mandate, perhaps due to the clarity of its laws and
cultural preference for certainty, discussed below.
299. See Law Modifying the Corporate Enterprises Act to Improve Corporate Governance
art. 251 (B.O.E. 2014, 293) (Spain).
300. See COMISIÓN NACIONAL DEL MERCADO DE VALORES, GOOD GOVERNANCE CODE OF
LISTED COMPANIES 823 (2015), https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/
Good_Governanceen.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FLA-Q9U3].
301. See id. at 9-10.
302. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280. Spain’s lack of success may be attributed to
the lack of cohesion in the government. While Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez is
considered a progressive, a new right-wing party has gained momentum in the nation’s
parliament. See Meaghan Beatley, Betting on Anti-Feminism as a Winning Political Strategy,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/spainvox-feminism/587824/ [https://perma.cc/Z9X9-ZRU9] (explaining the anti-feminist policies of
the Vox party). The influence of this right-wing party may be another factor explaining why
Spain has been unable to meet its BGD target. For a discussion on the political unrest
resulting from the multiple left parties failing to coordinate and the independence movement
of Catalan, see Sohail Jannessari, The Left Will Govern Spain, but the Far-Right Is the Real
Winner, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2019, 6:36 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/16/spainelection-vox-far-right-socialists-winner/ [https://perma.cc/43RJ-T5QQ].
303. See Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an
Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst [Law for the Equal
Participation of Women and Men in Management Positions in the Private and Public Sectors],
Apr. 24, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 655-56 (Ger.) [hereinafter German
Law]. This requirement did not apply to the management board, whose female numbers
remain unchanged. See Alexandra Fedorets, Anna Gibert & Norma Burow, Gender Quotas
in the Boardroom: New Evidence from Germany 10, 12, 21 (DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No.
1810, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423868 [https://perma.cc/S4AW-BDUX].
304. German Law, supra note 303, at 656.
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Overall, countries with legally required BGD have more than
doubled the percentages of women on boards, which is promising
compared to the minimal progress in countries without such
mandates.305 In support of the EU Directive, after reviewing the
statistics from member states with and without BGD legislation, the
EU Commission concluded “that legal instruments to enforce quotas
are an effective and fast means of achieving change.”306
B. Cultural
As discussed above, culture plays a key role in the likelihood of
women advancing to, and succeeding in, corporate leadership positions.307 In this Section, we examine the culture of EU member
states based on the Hofstede Cultural Dimension Index and analyze the cultural factors, such as masculinity, power distance, and

305. See Victor E. Sojo, Robert E. Wood, Sally A. Wood & Melissa A. Wheeler, Reporting
Requirements, Targets, and Quotas for Women in Leadership, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 519, 525
(2016); Johanne Grosvold & Stephen Brammer, National Institutional Systems as Antecedents
of Female Board Representation: An Empirical Study, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 116,
125, 132 (2011). In terms of the specific provisions in the BGD legislation that are effective,
we conclude that the more time companies are given to comply, the more likely they are to
achieve the targeted BGD. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280. The countries with the
BGD mandates took one to eight years to achieve compliance with an average of four to five
years. See id. The only country without a penalty was Spain. See id. Spain was also the only
country that did not meet its mandate, indicating the importance of consequences to successful implementation of these BGD requirements. See id.
306. JO ARMSTRONG & SYLVIA WALBY, EUR. PARLIAMENT, GENDER QUOTAS IN MANAGEMENT
BOARDS 4 (2012), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/462429/
IPOL-FEMM_NT(2012)462429_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC3B-FHNJ]. Although not analyzed
in this report, there are a number of other EU member states that have Corporate
Governance Codes addressing BGD, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK. See EUR. COMM’N, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC
DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU: PROGRESS REPORT 13-14 (2012), https://op.europa.eu/en/
publication-detail/-/publication/8832ea16-e2e6-4095-b1eb-cc72a22e28df/language-en#
[https://perma.cc/9CSQ-373J]. Comply or explain codes were introduced in these countries
with a strong aversion to legislated mandates. See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying
text. Theoretically, requiring companies to publicly explain their failure to meet their BGD
requirements could be sufficient external pressure to create more opportunities for women on
boards because of greater transparency in the decision-making process. Martha Foschi,
Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women, 59 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 237, 252 (1996).
Current levels of BGD in these countries, however, do not bear this theory out. See, EUR.
COMM’N, supra, at 5, 13-15 (concluding that legal BGD mandates have been more successful
than voluntary measures).
307. See supra Part I.C.
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uncertainty avoidance, that influence whether the legislated BGD
requirements are met.308 We find that culture not only shapes
whether BGD legislation is adopted, but it also influences the extent
to which the laws will actually broaden access for women.
France has lower scores on the Hofstede masculinity scale than
most other countries, meaning that collaboration and collective
wellbeing are valued and gender roles are less rigid.309 This is
evident “by its famous welfare system (securité sociale), the 35-hour
working week, five weeks of holidays per year, and [the country’s]
focus on the quality of life.”310 France has made significant strides
in gender equality in government, boards, and every area surveyed
by the European Institute of Gender Equality.311 This cultural context paved a clear path for BGD legislation. France is also high in
uncertainty avoidance, indicating a preference for clear rules, which
will make BGD laws more effective.312 This is particularly true given
that France’s legislation has a clear penalty for failure to meet the
BGD requirements and a clearly defined five-year timeframe to
comply.313
Italy, on the other hand, has one of the largest gender gaps in
Western Europe.314 The country scores very high on masculinity
according to the Hofstede Index, ranking seventh highest of seventysix countries.315 Italy is divided on power distance tolerance, which
308. See Cabeza-García et al., supra note 125, at 57.
309. See Country Comparison: France, supra note 151.
310. Id. A lower score indicates less concern with competition and a stronger focus on the
quality of life. See id. France scores sixty-eight on power distance and eighty-six on
uncertainty avoidance. Id. The high score on power distance represents acceptance of
inequality, but in this case the acceptance is with those in positions of power, rather than
preference for men over women. Id. The high score on uncertainty avoidance somewhat
explains the amount of planning and discussion that went into creating laws that advance
women. Id.
311. France scores a 74.6 on the Equality Index, the third highest out of all European
countries. Gender Equality Index: Index Score for France for the 2019 Edition, EUR. INST. FOR
GENDER EQUAL. (2019), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2019/FR [https://perma.
cc/5YMK-5559].
312. See Country Comparison: France, supra note 151.
313. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 306, at 13-15.
314. WORLD ECON. F., supra note 4, at 197 (showing that Italy ranked 117th out of 153
countries for economic participation and opportunity, 55th in educational attainment, 118th
for health and survival, and 44th for political empowerment).
315. Marco Tavanti, The Cultural Dimensions of Italian Leadership: Power Distance,
Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity from an American Perspective, 8 LEADERSHIP 287, 293
(2012).
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measures how hierarchical the country is and its tolerance for inequality.316 While Northern Italy touts a more egalitarian society,
Southern Italy accepts and endorses its hierarchy.317 However,
Italian society in general “continues by and large to privilege men
over women.”318 Italy also scores high in uncertainty avoidance,
preferring clear rules and shunning ambiguity.319 Despite the relative acceptance of inequality and traditional gender roles, Italy’s
legislated board quota law has been successful.320 This may be explained by the significant sanctions corporations face for failing to
increase female representation.321 This suggests that in less
egalitarian cultures like Italy, increases in diversity will not occur
naturally without firm regulations.322
The Netherlands has a very low masculinity score and prefers
compromise to winning.323 The Netherlands scores low on power distance and mid-range on uncertainty avoidance, which are all very
low compared to other EU member states.324 The low power distance
score represents a desire for equality in society.325 The uncertainty
avoidance score indicates that firm rules are not as influential to
change as they are in other countries.326 In 2013, the Netherlands
enacted a gender quota requirement of 30 percent for both listed
companies and the majority of state-owned enterprises to be
achieved by the end of 2016.327 The law was considered soft as there
were no sanctions for failing to comply.328 This is not surprising
given the relatively low uncertainty avoidance score, indicating
that hard rules and penalties are not necessary to encourage
316. See Country Comparison: Italy, supra note 149.
317. Id.
318. Tavanti, supra note 315, at 294.
319. Country Comparison: Italy, supra note 149.
320. See Maida & Weber, supra note 276, at 16 (“As in other countries, Italian listed
companies complied swiftly with the gender quota once the law was implemented. From 2011
to 2017 the number of board seats taken by women increased four-fold.”).
321. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
322. See Maida & Weber, supra note 276, at 17.
323. Country Comparison: The Netherlands, supra note 150.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Sonja A. Kruisinga & Linda Senden, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards in the
Netherlands: Waiting on the World to Change, in GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM 177,
177 (Cathrine Seierstad et al. eds., 2017).
328. Id.
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compliance.329 In December 2019, the Netherlands passed a new law
requiring listed companies to have at least 30 percent of supervisory
board seats held by women or risk having their appointment
nullified.330 Between 2013 and 2019, BGD rose from 25.1 percent to
31.3 percent.331
Spain scores low in masculinity, high in power distance, and high
in uncertainty avoidance.332 The low masculinity score is consistent
with Spain’s focus on consensus.333 Leaders prefer to consult with
minority opinions and gain agreement before moving forward with
new rules.334 Yet, hierarchy is accepted in society, which corresponds
to the high power distance score.335 Spain also has a strong appreciation for rules, hence the high uncertainty avoidance.336 Although
Spain generally accepts hierarchy, the low masculinity is likely why
it set one of the most ambitious targets for BGD at 40 percent.337
This cultural context has still allowed the country to experience
gains in BGD, even with only incentives and no penalties.338
Nonetheless, the country has not yet met its more ambitious goal of
40 percent of board seats being held by women.339
Germany scores high on the masculinity scale, with a society that
values performance and status.340 It has a relatively low power distance score and a high score for uncertainty avoidance.341 The low
power distance score represents a highly decentralized structure

329. See Country Comparison: The Netherlands, supra note 150.
330. Merle Weghoeft, The Netherlands Introduces New Legislation to Improve Gender
Diversity on Corporate Boards, SEUSS+ (Feb. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/3KBT-5ALE.
331. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
332. Country Comparison: Spain, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, https://www.hofstede-insights.com/
country-comparison/spain/ [https://perma.cc/FLJ2-8Y5N].
333. Id.
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. In Spain, female representation on boards rose from 6.8 percent to 11.6 percent
between 2005 and 2014. See Siri Terjesen, Why Some Board Gender Quotas Don’t Work,
CATALYST (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.catalyst.org/2019/02/12/why-some-board-genderquotas-dont-work/ [https://perma.cc/34TX-M7X4].
339. See id.
340. Country Comparison: Germany, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS, https://www.hofstede-insights.
com/country-comparison/germany/ [https://perma.cc/YX57-DGN7].
341. Id.
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with low tolerance for hierarchies.342 The high score on uncertainty
avoidance means that laws are well-thought-out and contain a lot
of detail to ensure certainty.343 Overall, Germany has exceeded its
BGD requirement of 30 percent.344
Previous research has found that cultural factors such as higher
levels of masculinity and power distance are most associated with
greater gender inequality.345 Contrary to what we expected, however, these cultural factors did not affect a country’s willingness to
adopt BGD requirements.346 Instead, high uncertainty avoidance
was more influential with countries that value certainty, preferring
clear laws requiring action.347 Further, some countries that scored
high in masculinity and/or power distance have still been successful
at increasing BGD, provided monetary penalties were incorporated
for failing to meet legislated requirements.348 While the details of
the legislation and the cultural context are key in analyzing the
effectiveness of BGD requirements, constitutional factors also significantly influence outcomes.
C. Constitutional
In 1982, when France first passed a political quota for women in
municipal elections, it was struck down as being an unconstitutional infringement on equality.349 After a series of laws to create
equality for women were also struck down,350 the Constitution was
amended in 2008 to add the following language: “statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as
well as to position[s] of professional and social responsibility.”351
See id.
See id.
See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
GEERT HOFSTEDE, GERT JAN HOFSTEDE & MICHAEL MINKOV, CULTURES AND
ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND 148, 152-53 (3d ed. 2010).
346. See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, supra note 306, at 14-15.
347. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
348. See id.
349. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 82-146DC, Nov. 18,
1982, J.O. 3475 (Fr.).
350. The 2006 BGD quota law was also struck down as unconstitutional. Conseil
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006-533DC, Mar. 16, 2006, J.O.
4446 (Fr.).
351. 1958 CONST. art. I (Fr.) (emphasis added).
342.
343.
344.
345.

2021]

BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY

549

What is important to note is that the legislative measures in France
addressing BGD did not take place until after its constitution was
amended in 2008; it was not until after the amendment that France
passed the Law for the Real Equality Between Women and Men,
which addressed persistent inequality in both the public and private
sectors.352
Although referred to as “substantive equality” or “real equality,”
what France did is indicative of the other countries that have
successfully passed legislated quota requirements.353 The 2011 BGD
law in France was almost identical to the 2006 law but was ruled
permissible because the Constitution now required positive action
to take place to achieve real equality between men and women.354
The high court in France has identified the requirement of positive
action as permitting a difference in treatment between men and
women to remedy inequalities that primarily impact women.355
In Germany, like France, initial attempts to create equality for
women through quotas were struck down as unconstitutional.356
This did not change until an amendment to the German Constitution in 1994: “The state shall promote the actual implementation of
equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate
disadvantages that now exist.”357 These amendments serve to
legitimize legislative measures, such as quotas, aimed at breaking
352. Loi 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l'égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes
[Law 2014-873 of August 4, 2014 for the Real Equality Between Women and Men], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 5, 2014, p.
12949.
353. The Italian Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the law without
regard to sex. Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.). It further states that:
It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social
nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding
the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all
workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country.
Id. Meanwhile, the Belgian Constitution guarantees equality between men and women. 1994
CONST. (Belg.) art. 10.
354. Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing
Global Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 381, 421-22 (2017).
355. Christopher McCrudden, Gender-Based Positive Action in Employment in Europe: A
Comparative Analysis of Legal and Policy Approaches in the EU and EEA 155 (Oct. 8, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3524238 [https://perma.cc/4EZ6CYYW].
356. Id. at 153.
357. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art. 3(2) (Ger.) (emphasis added).
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down the wide ranging historical and present-day barriers to women. A number of statutes promoting equality were enacted following
the amendment.358 Germany’s national parliament now consists of
30 percent women and its corporations have achieved 35.6 percent
female representation on their boards.359
These constitutional amendments move away from an antidiscrimination model that revolves around individual causes of action
and create an obligation on the government to create substantive
equality.360 While the purported goal of the antidiscrimination model is to address discrimination and break down historical patterns
of exclusion, it has been increasingly used to strike down laws
designed to remedy inequities by allowing men to sue for discrimination in response to equalizing measures.361
What results in the United States is that legislation requiring
positive action to achieve a certain minimum percentage of both
sexes is argued to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.362 In other words, with the way courts have interpreted
antidiscrimination constitutional provisions, quotas are likely to be
struck down due to the gender classification,363 just as they were
historically opposed in France and Germany. This distinction is
critical to understanding why the United States seems unable to
address inequality and why the current anticlassification formulation of the ERA, rather than an antisubordination formulation, will
not lead to the progress in gender equality that many of its advocates imagine.364

358. See Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [AGG] [General Act on Equal Treatment],
Apr. 3, 2013, BGBL. I at 1897 (Ger.); Gesetz über die Mitwirkung des Bundes an der
Besetzung von Gremien [BGremBG] [Federal Act on Appointment to Bodies], Apr. 24, 2015,
BGBL. I at 642; Gesetz für die Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern in der
Bundesverwaltung und in den Unternehmen und Gerichten des Bundes [BGleiG] [Federal Act
on Gender Equality], Apr. 24, 2015, BGBL. I at 642, 643. See generally Gender Mainstreaming:
Germany, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. (Nov. 2019), https://eige.europa.eu/gendermainstreaming/countries/germany [https://perma.cc/F73N-9GT2].
359. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
360. See Gender Mainstreaming, supra note 358.
361. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
362. See supra Part I.C.
363. See MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality, supra note 3, at 1292.
364. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004).
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V. PROPOSAL FOR SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
We cannot expect individuals, institutions, and a culture so
deeply tainted by sexism to voluntarily fix systemic discrimination.365 For meaningful substantive change, strong legal intervention is needed, including a legislated BGD requirement. After
examining what has worked in the EU, we conclude that the prospects for gender equality are not promising in the United States
under the current legal structure, given the cultural context in
which the system operates and the legal obstacles present. In this
Part, we use our investigation of what has been most effective in the
EU to propose a normative solution to increase the number of
women in U.S. board seats, which will pave the way for additional
action to increase equality.366
As indicated above, countries with BGD requirements fare better
than those without—seven367 of the eight countries with BGD
requirements have exceeded their quota, leaving only Spain falling
short of its goal.368 France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Germany all exceed 33.3 percent, demonstrating a critical mass.369
Even countries in the EU that have instituted “soft measures” have
had success in increasing BGD beyond what the United States has
been able to accomplish.370 In the United States, California is the
only state that has enacted a BGD requirement.371 Although this
365. See supra Part I.
366. The goal is to move from a vicious cycle of discrimination to a virtuous cycle of women
improving conditions for other women. See Sue Duke, The Key to Closing the Gender Gap?
Putting More Women in Charge, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2017/11/women-leaders-key-to-workplace-equality/ [https://perma.cc/PH74-YXML]
(“Our data shows that when women are better represented in leadership roles, more women
are hired across the board.... Additionally, prior World Economic Forum research indicates
that female CEOs actually pay their high-earning women more than male CEOs do, which
may create a financial incentive for women to join such companies.... Our analysis found a
strong correlation between the representation of women in leadership positions in a given
industry and hiring rates for additional women leaders.”).
367. Portugal has now met its 2018 mandate. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
368. Spain is unique in that it does not have a penalty provision and only provides incentives for meeting the quota. See id.
369. See id.
370. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 267, at 27. Countries with hard quotas averaged a BGD of
37.5 percent, those with soft quotas 25.6 percent, and those with neither 14.3 percent. Id.
371. See supra Part III.A.
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law is an important signal to corporations, it may not achieve its
aims due to challenges looming in the broader cultural and legal
landscape in the United States.372 As such, a small but significant
change must be made to the U.S. Constitution.
As we explore infra, positive law is necessary to overcome the
biases discussed in Part I and to pave the way for greater substantive equality that changes the lived experiences of women. This will
impact the outcomes for both those women who aspire to sit on
boards and those who end up serving on boards, who will be navigating a traditionally male-dominated environment.373 Although a
BGD requirement will not eliminate all of the unconscious biases
held by gatekeepers, this structural change will limit the impact of
these biases on decision-making because it will result in more women being added to boards, which in turn will eventually shift group
dynamics and help normalize women in leadership positions.374
What can the United States learn from the EU? Although seven
of the eight countries with BGD requirements met their quotas, we
find that the three most successful countries (France, Italy, and
Belgium), based on the highest three percentages of women on
boards (45.3 percent, 36.1 percent, and 35.9 percent, respectively),
had the most in common with each other.375 We identify the following characteristics as being correlated with success. The top three
countries had: (1) constitutional amendments authorizing positive
action to achieve substantive equality between women and men;
(2) BGD legislation, which included sanctions for failure to comply;
and (3) a significant enough time period to comply with the mandate
(five years).376
As such, we conclude that a legal foundation must be created
prior to enacting BGD requirements to overcome the current
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, which was not designed,
amended, or interpreted to create true equality for women.377 Thus,
it is vital that the United States adopt a newly crafted Substantive
372. See supra Part I.C.
373. Cabeza-García et al., supra note 125, at 64.
374. Houser, supra note 20, at 319-20 (explaining how Kahneman and Tversky’s System
1 and System 2 thinking categories lead to erroneous judgments that become deep-rooted
beliefs).
375. See Houser & Williams, supra note 280.
376. See id.
377. See Suk, supra note 354, at 391-93.
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Equality Amendment to require that positive action be taken to
advance women’s equality.378 The current anticlassification language in the ERA will limit meaningful change and in fact could
lead to more “reverse-discrimination” claims brought by white men
to strike down laws designed to remove barriers to women’s participation in the economy, politics, and other spheres of influence.379
It is instructive that among the seventeen EU countries that have
taken measures to increase BGD, even without a EU Directive or
Regulation requiring them to do so,380 thirteen of them (Finland,
Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal,
Italy, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, and Austria) had previously
amended their Constitutions to either permit or require positive
action (such as quota laws or other measures) to achieve gender
equality.381 Permitting positive action means that laws promoting
the advancement of women cannot be stuck down as discriminatory.
This is the missing piece to achieving substantive equality in the
United States.
Although Congress adopted the ERA in 1972, the Amendment
was not fully implemented.382 Proponents of the ERA list women’s
378. See id. at 393.
379. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 662-65.
380. France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Austria have binding quotas, while
Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Finland,
and Sweden have soft quota laws. Gender Statistics Database: Legislative Quotas Can Be
Strong Drivers for Gender Balance in Boardrooms, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. (June 28,
2019), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/data-talks/legislative-quotas-can-be-strongdrivers-gender-balance-boardrooms [https://perma.cc/G82W-6VPW]. Soft quota laws either
only apply to state-owned entities or are applied without sanctions. Id. Switzerland approved
such a law in 2019. See Parliament Approves Quotas for Women on Company Boards, SWISS
INFO (June 19, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/minimumrepresentation_
parliament-approves-quotas-for-women-on-companyboards/45042736 [https://perma.cc/P74BREAR].
381. Suk, supra note 354, at 401-02.
382. The originally proposed language was streamlined in 1943: “Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
sex.” Russell Berman, The Equal Rights Amendment Is an Artifact No More, ATLANTIC (Nov.
8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/virginia-equal-rights-amend
ment-women-constitution/601609/ [https://perma.cc/9WYN-383E]. Although the Attorney
General’s Office of the United States has opined that the amendment’s time for ratification
has expired, several other scholars have argued that it is still viable. See Ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1-3 (2020); Gerard N. Magliocca, Buried Alive: The
Reboot of the Equal Rights Amendment, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 633, 637-38 (2019). See
generally John Vlahoplus, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: Lessons from Special
Elections to the House of Representatives in 1837, 95 IND. L.J. SUPP. 79 (2020).
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underrepresentation in positions of power, like corporate boards, as
one of the inequalities that the ERA could address.383 Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), who has reintroduced the ERA over
the past few years, directly linked her support for the Amendment
to the underrepresentation of women in government and business.384
However, scholar Julie Suk argues that the ERA must be conceptualized as a twenty-first century legal infrastructure of gender equality.385 Her analysis suggests that a modern reimagined version of
the ERA could disrupt the current status quo of gender inequality
“such as pay inequity; women’s economic disadvantages related to
pregnancy, maternity, and caregiving; women’s underrepresentation in positions of economic and political power; and violence
against women.”386
We also feel that the current iteration of the amendment is
insufficient to effect change. A new version must go beyond intermediate scrutiny, disparate impact, and other traditional antidiscrimination tools.387 An antidiscrimination constitutional approach
is insufficient, as demonstrated by persistent gender inequality
despite the numerous court cases filed in the United States. This
insufficiency is also demonstrated by the failure of BGD requirements to pass constitutional scrutiny in various EU member states
until their constitutions were amended.388 Suk concludes that the
place to begin is with state constitutional amendments requiring
positive action, noting that there is already precedent, such as the
right to education, which is absent from the federal Constitution.389
She explains how a state constitutional right could require the
Supreme Court to stop striking down legislation that attempts to
promote equality because equal rights would be a “compelling state
interest.”390
Scholar Christopher McCrudden’s work analyzing positive action
in employment in Europe also makes the connection between constitutional language and the permissibility of positive legislative
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Suk, supra note 354, at 391-93.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 384-85.
Id. at 385.
See supra Part IV.C.
Suk, supra note 354, at 439.
Id. at 440.
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action to advance women’s equality using several EU member states
as models.391 Although Suk focused on state constitutions in the
United States, and covered a variety of progressive issues, such as
pregnancy rights, McCrudden focuses on the differences in the laws
of the member states in the EU and EEA,392 specifically on employment issues, including BGD.393 He also concludes that focusing on
antidiscrimination is insufficient to advance women’s participation
in leadership.394 He confirms that a constitutional amendment requiring positive action to address inequality is necessary to enact
laws that will not be invalidated under an antidiscrimination
model.395 In the United States, this is a prime concern. A constitutional provision (the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause) and legislation (such as Title VII) that should in theory be
used to improve the conditions for women and underrepresented
minorities are instead repeatedly used to strike down laws and
policies designed to combat institutional and individual biases.396 As
such, an amendment requiring positive action to reduce inequality
and advance substantive equality must be adopted.
Building on the established work of both Suk and McCrudden, we
conclude that the United States must first move away from an
anticlassification, antidiscrimination model to one of social reproduction.397 After examining the factors behind the success that certain member states in the EU have had in increasing the number of
women in important decision-making positions, and given how far
the United States lags behind the industrialized world in terms of
equality, we propose a new equal rights amendment (the “Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Substantive Equality Amendment”) to the U.S.
Constitution:

391. McCrudden, supra note 355, at 2.
392. The EEA consists of the member states of the EU and three countries of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway; excluding Switzerland).
EEA Agreement, EFTA, https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement [https://perma.cc/8C9A3KND]. The Agreement on the EEA entered into force on January 1, 1994. Id.
393. McCrudden, supra note 355, at 2.
394. See id. at 166-67.
395. See id. at 168-69.
396. See, e.g., supra note 233 and accompanying text.
397. Although Suk does not envision quotas as being a necessary outcome of a new ERA,
our research supports the extension of her argument to the U.S. Constitution. See Suk, supra
note 354, at 444.
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In order to address centuries of inequality, the United States
government shall promote the substantive equality of women in
both the public and private sector. No law designed to correct
the lesser status of women shall be struck down as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.

This language goes beyond the wording in most of the Amendments398 we examined because of the insidious inequality that exists
in the United States and the troubling retreat from progress here.399
Once there is a constitutional foundation for equality laws that
work, legislative BGD requirements like California SB 826 will be
needed and will be more likely to pass constitutional scrutiny.400
The problem with relying on the Fourteenth Amendment and
current equality legislation in the United States is not only the
anticlassification framing, but also the reliance on an antiquated
antidiscrimination model that seeks to punish the “bad actor,”
ignoring the history of deeply entrenched systemic sexism and racism that pervades U.S. legal, family, religious, and business
structures.401 This current antidiscrimination approach in both the
398. For example, Article 116(2) of Greece’s Constitution reads: “Adoption of positive
measures for promoting equality between men and women does not constitute discrimination
on grounds of sex. The State shall take measures for the elimination of inequalities actually
existing, in particular to the detriment of women.” 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION]
116(2). We feel that it must be made clear that the intent of this new amendment is to remedy
the inequality that women face. The amendment is not intended to create a right of “reversediscrimination” by men.
399. See Shilpa Phadke & Alexandra Schmitt, Protecting and Promoting Women’s Rights
Is Key to Defeating the Coronavirus at Home and Abroad, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 29,
2020, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2020/05/29/485606/
protecting-promoting-womens-rights-key-defeating-coronavirus-home-abroad/ [https://
perma.cc/Y6X9-9SYM] (“Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s failure to lead and its
continued attacks on women’s rights during this crisis have impeded the U.S. recovery from
COVID-19 and squandered the opportunity for global leadership. Instead of following the
guidance of health experts and government officials, President Donald Trump and other antichoice policymakers are undermining women’s economic security and restricting fundamental reproductive rights at home and abroad at a time when the well-being of women and
families is critical to long-term recovery.”).
400. “Instead of using the constitutional right to sex equality as a shield against sexist
government action,” as it is currently conceptualized, Suk “proposes that a constitutional
guarantee of sex equality be approached as a foundation for federal and state governmental
initiatives to build gender-equal infrastructures.” Suk, supra note 354, at 384.
401. “Laws directed at malevolent individual bad actors miss the picture,” because they
“fail to redress the more complex and embedded systemic bias, structural impediments, and
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Constitution and statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 only seeks to put out a single campfire here and there, while
ignoring the raging inferno of structural inequality that exists in the
United States.402
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes is a prime example of how the
current antidiscrimination framing of local, state, and federal legislation in the United States is entirely insufficient to remedy mass
gender discrimination.403 In Wal-Mart, some 1.5 million female WalMart employees alleged that the company discriminated against
them in violation of Title VII by denying women equal pay and
promotions due to the lack of objective criteria for promotions and
allowing store-level discretion in employment matters.404 Despite
the Ninth Circuit upholding class certification three times, the
Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, reversed by rejecting expert
testimony showing how local decision-making implicates unconscious bias which resulted in women receiving lower pay and fewer
promotions.405
Given the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment, the language of the 1972 ERA will not achieve what
women expect because it is simply another antidiscrimination
measure.406 As discussed earlier, another enormous obstacle is the
gendered norms that continue to fuel gender inequality.” Thomas, supra note 230, at 2-3 (citing MARTHA CHAMMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER
AND TORT LAW 125-26 (2010); Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options
for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 38-39 (2014); Nicole E.
Negowetti, Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession’s “Diversity Crisis”: A Call for SelfReflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930, 953 (2015)).
402. Id. at 3 (“Two hundred years of harm, and more than fifty years of modern feminist
legal reform are more than enough to dispel the notion that the status quo is sufficient or that
more basic measures like general prohibitions of discrimination or good-faith efforts must first
be exhausted.”).
403. See 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
404. Id. at 342-45.
405. See id. at 340, 347-48, 353-57, 367.
406. Supporters of the 1972 ERA argue that adding gender to the Constitution would
elevate it to “the same status and scrutiny as race and symbolically would establish a
constitutional commitment to gender equality.” Tracy A. Thomas, More than the Vote: The
Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 349, 376 (2020).
They assert that this would make it more difficult for courts to undermine gender equality in
relation to other protected rights, such as religious liberty. See id. (citing Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 735-36 (2014)). But see Suk, supra note 354, at 394-95
(discussing how the wording of the ERA is similar to the language in the Equal Protection
Clause and that the ERA would likely be construed as another antidiscrimination measure).
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use of the Equal Protection Clause by white men to strike down
laws that seek to remedy historic discrimination as somehow being
violative of their rights.407 Using clear language, such as that in our
proposed constitutional amendment, will follow the direction of numerous EU member states and disallow these cases that are simply
a deflection from the true problem of our history riddled with
subordination of women. By indicating that no law passed in
accordance with the goal of increasing equality for women can be
struck down as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the United
States will have set in place the much-needed and much-delayed
foundation for equality between men and women.
Looking to the European model of advocating positive measures
to advance women’s equality,408 legislation must then be enacted to
provide women the right of access to egalitarian institutions, rather than just a right to not be discriminated against.409 Including
language similar to that found in the constitutional amendments of
several European countries guaranteeing equality for women and
requiring the government, and in some cases businesses, to create
gender-equal infrastructures, would significantly shorten the time
by which women in the United States can achieve parity with men
in important decision-making arenas.410
To implement a “positive measure” or “positive action” approach
to gender equality, the first step is to identify the specific objectives
to be achieved.411 In this case, we focus on improving female representation in important decision-making roles, such as on corporate boards. Second, positive measures must be identified and
For a discussion on the history and results of equal protection cases, see Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689-90 (2017).
407. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 662 (describing these so-called reverse discrimination
cases).
408. See McCrudden, supra note 355, at 19; Suk, supra note 354, at 400.
409. Suk, supra note 354, at 384. While Suk focuses on how a new ERA could address
pay inequity, unfair treatment of pregnant workers and mothers, violence against women,
women’s underrepresentation in leadership, and other postindustrial gender inequalities,
we focus on BGD in this paper.
410. See id. Suk explains how the language in the current ERA matches the language in
the Equal Protection Clause and does not require strict scrutiny for sex classifications in the
law, invalidate government practices that have a disparate impact on women, nor expand
Congress’s authority to take proactive measures, but most likely would be interpreted as
another antidiscrimination policy. Id. at 394-95.
411. McCrudden, supra note 355, at 11.
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implemented.412 This is important, as currently the focus is on eliminating the negative (that is, antidiscrimination) rather than promoting the positive (that is, positive action). If equality is truly a
goal, the paradigm must shift to enact laws promoting this goal by
increasing the number of women in decision-making roles.
This positive action approach to the Constitution and legislation
would pave the way for more laws like California SB 826 and
increase the effectiveness of these laws. In addition to the constitutional amendment, there are several other adjustments we would
propose for states that wish to emulate California’s BGD law to
improve outcomes. While SB 826 does contain sanctions for failure
to comply, it lacks two of the three requirements described above
that resulted in success for EU member states. For example, while
California does have monetary penalties for noncompliance, it only
gives corporations one year to comply.413 Additionally, the U.S.
Constitution does not contain positive language. We found each to
be important to a BGD requirement’s success. While constitutional
challenges are pending under both the United States and California
constitutions, the mere existence of such a law may nevertheless
increase BGD in California. However, federal legislation is preferred
for a more systematic approach to end gender exclusion nationwide.
Thus, we propose the following federal legislation to increase the
participation of women on corporate boards:
Companies regulated by the SEC will add a sufficient number of
women on their boards of directors to reach a balanced presence
of women and men within five years of the effective date of this
Act. The provisions of the preceding sentence will be taken into
account when making appointments to both a company’s executive and nonexecutive boards. For the intents and purposes of
this Act, balanced membership will be understood to mean the
presence of women and men in a manner such that neither sex
accounts for more than 60 nor less than 40 percent of the total.

412. Id.
413. S.B. 826 § 2(a), (e)(1), 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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CONCLUSION
Because of the stubborn existence of institutional and individual
biases that severely inhibit the advancement of women into economic seats of power, action must be taken at a national level to
remove the obstacles to gender equality. The time for substantive
equality is now. While quotas can formally require institutions to
hire female directors, such laws cannot address all problems of the
informal social structures that exclude female participation.414 Some
opponents of a gender quota approach claim that quotas fail to
address the real problem and policymakers’ focus should instead be
on eliminating the obstacles women and racial minorities face when
seeking leadership positions.415 Although we acknowledge that this
proposal is only one step, and broader cultural change is also
necessary for full equality, this approach is a good starting point
towards normalizing women in important decision-making roles.
While California’s attempt to address women’s inequality is admirable, it is of doubtful constitutional validity and may not contain
all of the factors needed to accomplish its goal. Although quotas are
an “effective, systemic, and long-lasting remed[y]” to address
systemic discrimination,416 in order for BGD requirements to pass
constitutional scrutiny, it is necessary to first amend the U.S.
Constitution to not only permit, but also to require, the government
and private business to take positive measures to most quickly and
effectively reduce these barriers. Next, federal legislation requiring
gender parity must be passed to make meaningful strides toward
substantive equality. The success seen in the EU by member states
that have implemented measures in important economic seats of
power demonstrates the efficacy of these legislated BGD requirements with the proper constitutional foundation. Because the
United States is profoundly behind the EU, as well as the rest of the
industrialized world, in gender equality, taking immediate positive
action is a national imperative.

414. Tewari et al., supra note 59, at 249.
415. Rhode & Packel, supra note 48, at 414.
416. Thomas, supra note 230, at 3.

